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Abstract 
 
Philosophers use the phrase "moral intuition" to describe the appearance in consciousness 
of moral judgments or assessments without any awareness of having gone through a 
conscious reasoning process that produces this assessment. This paper investigates the 
neural substrates of moral intuition. We propose that moral intuitions are part of a larger 
set of social intuitions that guide us through complex, highly uncertain and rapidly 
changing social interactions. Such intuitions are shaped by learning. The neural substrates 
for moral intuition include fronto-insular, cingulate, and orbito-frontal cortices and 
associated subcortical structure such as the septum, basil ganglia and amygdala. 
Understanding the role of these structures undercuts many philosophical doctrines 
concerning the status of moral intuitions, but vindicates the claim that they can 
sometimes play a legitimate role in moral decision-making. 
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1. 
 
By “moral intuition” contemporary philosophers mean moral assessments, 
judgments, or responses to behavior in actual or hypothetical scenarios, where these 
responses typically occur quickly or automatically and carry with them a strong feeling of 
authority or appropriateness but where one need not be (and often is not) aware of any 
conscious reasoning process that leads to this assessment. Intuition, in this sense, is meant 
to contrast with moral judgments that are reached on the basis of some extended process 
of deliberate or explicit reasoning. Consider the well-known trolley problem (Foot, 1978; 
Thomson, 1976) which consists of the following pair of examples: In the first, a runaway 
trolley is headed toward a group of five people and will kill them unless diverted. You 
are able to flip a switch which will divert the trolley onto a siding, but if you do so one 
person on the siding will be killed. In the second version, again there is a runaway trolley 
 2 
which will kill five people unless stopped. In this case, however, the only way to stop the 
trolley is to push a fat man into its path. This will kill the fat man but save the other five. 
 
Most people, at least in western societies and perhaps more generally, have the 
immediate and strongly felt moral intuition that re-directing the trolley onto the track on 
which one person is standing in order to save the five in the trolley’s path is morally 
permissible. Most people also have the intuition that pushing the fat man into the path of 
the trolley in the second example is not morally permissible. However, notoriously, most 
people have little insight into or conscious awareness of the process that has generated 
these responses and have great difficulty articulating more general reasons or principles 
which would “explain” or justify these particular responses. 
 
As a second illustration, consider the following example, originally due to 
Williams (1973). You are an explorer in a remote jungle in South America. You come 
upon a village and the local military official, Pedro, who tells you that the Indian 
inhabitants of the village have been engaging in anti-government activity. Pedro says that 
he intends to execute ten (arbitrarily selected) inhabitants as a reprisal measure, but adds 
that if you will shoot one of these yourself, he will spare the other nine. If you refuse he 
will immediately kill all ten. Many people regard this a deep moral dilemma—they have 
the strongly felt intuition that it would be very wrong to kill the one, but also feel the 
weight of the consideration that ten will die if they fail to act. 
 
A broadly similar understanding of moral intuition can be found among 
psychologists and neurobiologists, although with the important difference that 
psychologists are far more likely than philosophers to think of affect and emotion as 
playing an important role. (see below). Jonathan Haidt (2001) describes moral intuition as 
“the sudden appearance in consciousness of moral judgment, including affective valence 
(good–bad, like–dislike) without any conscious awareness of having gone through steps 
of search, weighing evidence or inferring a conclusion.” He gives as an example the 
immediate judgment most people have that brother-sister incest is wrong, even in a case 
in which the most obvious forms of harm are stipulated to be absent—the pair are 
consenting adults, there is no possibility of pregnancy, no psychological problems 
resulting from the incest and so on. When subjects are asked to explain or justify their 
judgments they appeal initially to possible harms/bad consequences (possible creation of 
a child with birth defects, etc.) and then when reminded that the case is one in which it is 
stipulated that these harms will not be present, they retreat to saying that the action just 
seems wrong, although they cannot explain why—a response that Haidt describes as 
“moral dumbfounding”. Haidt takes such examples to illustrate the independence of 
moral intuition from processes of deliberate, explicit reasoning. 
 
Although no one doubts that, as an empirical matter, we have such intuitive moral 
responses, there is a great deal of disagreement about their nature, about the processes 
that underlie or generate them, and about their legitimate role, if any, in moral and 
political argument. Many moral philosophers think that comparison with intuition 
provides at least a prima-facie standard for evaluating more general moral principles or 
theories—that is, it is a consideration in favor of a moral theory if it generates judgments 
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that agree with widely accepted intuitions, and a consideration that counts against it if it 
yields judgments that contravene accepted intuitions. Thus it counts against a moral 
theory (it is “contrary to intuition”) if it tells us that it is permissible to push the fat man 
in front of the trolley, and it is a point in favor of a moral theory if it yields the opposite 
judgment. Among those taking this view, there are a range of different attitudes regarding 
the stringency of this requirement. Some writers hold that agreement with intuition is the 
only standard for assessing a moral theory and that in principle at least any disagreement 
between theory and intuition is grounds for rejecting the former. On this view, the 
deliverances of intuition are accepted at face value, and the task of moral theory is simply 
to describe or systematize these, but not to override or replace them. Sometimes this view 
takes the form of the more specific suggestion that intuitions play something like the role 
of “observation” in science—just as the task of scientific theorizing (it is claimed) is to 
explain what we observe, so the task of moral theory is to explain or justify our intuitions. 
Other writers suggest that although agreement with intuition is one consideration in 
assessing moral theories, there are other considerations as well. For example, one popular 
view, associated with John Rawls (1971), is that intuitions about particular cases and 
judgments about more general principles should be mutually adjusted in the light of each 
other in a process of “reflective equilibrium”. In this view, individual intuitions are not 
sacrosanct; they may be rejected based on considerations of overall coherence with other 
intuitions and general principles, although intuition still remains as an important 
constraint on moral theorizing.  
 
Still other writers (Bentham 1789; Unger, 1996) take a much more negative and 
dismissive view of the role of moral intuition. They suggest that such intuitions are often 
(or usually or even always) the product of “prejudice,” “self-serving bias,” or arbitrary 
contingencies or idiosyncrasies of enculturation or upbringing and that even single 
subjects will often have inconsistent intuitions. They conclude that appeals to intuition 
should play at best a very limited role in guiding moral argument and decision-making, 
and that considerations of consistency and theoretical coherence may justifiably lead us 
to reject or override many or most moral intuitions. (As we note below, this stance is 
rarely followed consistently.) In this spirit, Peter Singer (1974/2002, p. 47) suggests that  
 
we should take seriously the assumption that all of the particular moral judgments 
we intuitively make are likely to derive from discarded religious systems, from 
warped views of sex and bodily functions, or from customs necessary for survival 
of the group in social and economic circumstances that now lie in the distant past, 
in which case it would be best to forget all about our particular moral judgments. 
 
Just as there is no agreement about the proper role of appeals to intuition within 
moral argument, there is also (and relatedly) no consensus about the nature and character 
of intuition itself. In addition to those who favor a bias or prejudice view of intuition, 
there are, among those who take a less dismissive view of its status, those who advocate a 
rationalist picture in which moral intuition is like insight into logical or mathematical 
truths or into the status of propositions that are in some suitably broad sense “a priori.” 
On this view, the truths revealed by intuition are thought to be self-evident and rationally 
compelling in just the same way that mathematical truths are; it is exactly their status as a 
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priori truths that makes them seem so obvious and irresistible. Others (e.g. McDowell 
(1985), and McGrath (2004)), guided by the analogy with observation, think of moral 
intuition as like, or perhaps even literally, an instance of ordinary visual perception and as 
sometimes yielding moral knowledge for just this reason--according to McGrath (2004), 
“If Jim knows that the children acted wrongly in setting the cat on fire, then…he has this 
piece of knowledge because he perceives that the children acted wrongly in setting the cat 
on fire” (p. 227). Still others mix perceptual and reason-based analogies as in Roger 
Crisp’s (approving) characterization of Sidgwick’s view of intuition as “not gut feeling 
but a belief which after careful observation presents itself as a dictate of reason” (2002, 
pp. 70- 71). 
 
A common thread in much of the discussion of intuition by moral philosophers is 
the denial that emotional processing plays any very important role in moral intuition or at 
least in the kind of intuition that has legitimate probative force in moral argument. For 
example, Frances Kamm (1993) recommends the following method in ethics which 
draws on the idea that moral intuition can deliver a priori truths that are independent of 
contingent facts about human emotional responses: 
 
[one] begins with responses [that is, “intuitions”] to particular cases--either 
detailed practical cases or hypothetical cases with just enough detail for 
hypothetical purposes. [One then tries] to construct more general principles from 
these data… 
 
She goes on to say: 
 
The responses to cases with which I am concerned are not emotional responses but 
judgments about the permissibility or impermissibility of certain acts…. 
These judgments are not guaranteed to be correct [but] if they are, they should fall 
into the realm of a priori truths. They are not like racist judgments that one race is 
superior to another. The reason is that the racist is claiming to have “intuitions” 
about empirical matters and this is as inappropriate as having intuitions about the 
number of the planets or the chemical structure of water. Intuitions are appropriate 
to ethics because ours is an a priori, not an empirical investigation. (1993, p. 8) 
 
Other writers hold, unlike Kamm, that emotions are likely to be involved in many cases 
of moral intuition, but they tend to focus on the ways in which emotions detract from the 
normative or epistemic credentials of our intuitions. For example, in a recent discussion 
of moral intuition, Sinnott-Armstrong (2006, p. 203) suggests that the involvement of 
emotion in moral intuition often restricts the range of considerations to which subjects 
respond: “Emotions stop subjects from considering the many factors in these examples. If 
this interpretation is correct, then many pervasive and fundamental moral beliefs result 
from emotions that cloud judgment.” While Sinnott- Armstrong  also  allows  for the 
possibility that  the involvement of emotion can sometimes   enhance judgment,  his 
focus tends to be on the potentially distorting effects of emotion.   We will argue below 
that under the right circumstances the involvement of the emotions in moral intuition can   
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enlarge (rather than restrict) the range of morally relevant considerations that subjects 
take into account and in this way lead to morally superior judgments and decisions. 
 
Many but not all philosophers writing on moral intuition also associate intuition 
with very specific metaphysical doctrines. For example, Stratton-Lake in the introduction 
to his recently edited volume Ethical Intutionism (2002) claims that this philosophical 
position (and presumably also those who regard intuition as a source of moral knowledge 
or information) are committed to cognitivism (that the beliefs which are the outputs of 
intuition are the sorts of things that can be true or false) as well as realism and non-
naturalism (roughly that there are “objective” facts about rightness and wrongfulness that 
are “out there” in the world and that make moral beliefs true or false but which also at the 
same time have a special metaphysical status which makes them not identical with 
ordinary, garden-variety “natural” facts of the sort that might be studied by science). 
 
Philosophical views about intuition also vary considerably as to what sorts of 
things are possible or trustworthy objects of intuition. Some writers who appeal to moral 
intuition focus largely or entirely on intuitions about particular cases--for example, 
particular episodes in which we see that some animal is mistreated and have the 
immediate intuition that this particular action is wrong. Other writers hold that we also 
have intuitions about more general and abstract moral principles or considerations, as in 
Sidgwick’s well-known contention that among the “ethical axioms—intuitive 
propositions of real clearness and certainty” is the “self-evident principle that the good of 
any one individual is of no more importance from the point of view (if I may say so) of 
the Universe than the good of any other” (Sidgwick, 1907). Indeed, some writers (Singer, 
Unger) argue that intuitions about general principles are more trustworthy or deserve to 
be taken more seriously than those concerning particular cases, because the latter are 
more likely to be subject to various biases. 
 
Regardless of one’s views about the normative status of moral intuition we may 
inquire, in a naturalistic vein, about the psychological and neural systems that are 
associated with or subserve such intuition, about how these relate to the systems 
associated with other sorts of psychological and reasoning processes, and about how such 
systems contribute to moral and other kinds of decision-making. These are important 
empirical questions in their own right, but one might also hope that a better 
understanding of the sources and character of moral intuition will help to clarify its 
legitimate role in moral argument. Both sets of questions will be pursued in this essay. As 
we will see, a more empirically adequate understanding of moral intuition should lead us 
to reject a number of widely accepted views (in both philosophy and psychology) about 
its nature and about its normative significance. 
 
2. 
 
We first summarize the general picture of moral intuition that will emerge from 
our discussion and then turn to details. We think of moral intuition as belonging to the 
general category of social cognition, where this has to do with the information processing 
involved in navigating the social world: Predicting and understanding the behavior and 
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mental states of others, recognizing behavior and intentions that are potentially beneficial 
or harmful to oneself or those one cares about and responding appropriately, anticipating 
and recognizing how others are likely to respond to one’s own choices, and so on. The 
neural areas activated when subjects have “moral intuitions” in response to moral 
decision tasks (Moll et al., 2002) seem to be areas involved in social cognition more 
generally, or at least in those aspects of social cognition that involve relatively fast, 
automatic and affect-laden processing. These areas, which include orbito-frontal, insular, 
and anterior cingulate cortices and the amygdala are involved in the processing of various 
complex social emotions such as guilt, embarrassment, resentment resulting from unfair 
treatment, and in the recognition of emotions in others (Shin et al., 2000; Berthoz et al., 
2002; Singer et al., 2004a; Sanfey et al., 2003, Baron-Cohen et al., 1999). The first three 
of these structures are also involved in the detection and monitoring of visceral, bodily 
sensations including in particular those associated with food ingestion and expulsion and 
with introspective awareness of one’s own feelings (Craig, 2004; Critchley et al., 2004). 
They are also involved in empathy (Singer et al., 2004b), and in making decisions under 
conditions of social uncertainty regarding the behavior of others (Sanfey et al., 2003; 
Singer et al., 2004a). This sort of fast processing seems necessary for the successful real 
time prediction of others’ behavior in socially complex situations and for generating 
suitable responses to such behavior. Typically such processing involves the integration of 
a large number of disparate social cues and considerations into a coordinated response, 
where the complexity and high dimensionality of these cues as well as the need for quick 
responses may make it difficult to employ explicit and self-conscious cost/benefit 
calculations or other explicit rule-based strategies. Indeed, as we shall see, there is 
evidence that subjects who attempt to employ strategies based exclusively on rule based 
deliberation often end up making normatively worse choices than subjects who employ 
strategies that allow a greater role for “intuition” and the emotional processing associated 
with it. 
 
We will argue that understanding the structures and processes subserving moral 
intuition should lead us to reject many ideas about moral intuition that are common in the 
philosophical literature. First, an accurate empirical picture of moral intuition strongly 
suggests that there is no specialized or dedicated faculty devoted just to moral intuition or 
moral cognition. Instead, our capacity for moral intuition (and moral cognition and 
decision making) largely derive from and are structured by our more general capacities 
for social cognition. There is thus no reason to suppose that what underlies our capacity 
for moral intuition is a capacity to detect or reason about non-natural or metaphysically 
mysterious properties of some kind–instead what we are responding to are features of our 
social world (including the behavior and mental states of others) and how these affect 
what we care about. 
 
Second, and contrary to the inclination of many philosophers to dismiss or 
downplay the role of emotion and affect in moral intuition, there is, as already remarked, 
considerable empirical evidence that the neural areas involved in paradigmatic cases of 
moral intuition are also centrally involved in emotional processing and that manipulation 
of emotional processing affects the content of one’s moral intuitions. Moreover, much of 
this emotional processing is unconscious, so that subjects are often unable to tell when 
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(or which) emotional processes have played a role in generating their intuitions, and thus 
are unable to follow the advice of Kamm and others to discount intuitions in which 
emotion has played a role. Of course, one may simply stipulate that by “moral intuition” 
one means something that does not involve emotion, but such stipulation seems arbitrary 
and unmotivated, given the character of the neural systems that are activated in what are 
ordinarily thought of as cases involving the exercise of moral intuition. Put slightly 
differently, if one decides that by definition, “intuition” cannot involve emotional 
processing, then many cases which philosophers like Kamm think of as involving appeals 
to intuition may turn out to involve no such thing because of the involvement of affective 
processes in generating the responses in question. There might be a point to such a 
stipulation if, from a normative point of view, intuitions that do not involve emotion or 
affect were, in addition to being common, somehow more reliable or likely to lead to 
better moral judgment and decision, but there are strong reasons to doubt that this is the 
case. In fact, there is considerable empirical evidence that subjects with damage to the 
areas involved in emotional processing (and in moral intuition) make decisions that both 
in terms of their effects on self and others are “bad” by the standards of virtually all 
widely accepted criteria for prudential and moral decision-making (Damasio, 1994). 
Good moral decision-making seems to require the involvement of emotional processing 
and affect, which is not to deny that it also involves processes that look more purely 
cognitive. We thus deny the very widespread view that the involvement of emotion in 
moral intuition and decision-making, usually leads to decisions that are normatively 
inferior (in comparison with decisions that are based more purely on reason). While we 
agree with  Sinnott-Armstrong’s claim that the involvement of certain kinds of emotion 
in moral judgment can lead  to the neglect of morally relevant considerations, and a 
narrowing of moral focus, we also think that the involvement of the right sort of emotion 
can have the opposite effect (Sinnott-Armstrong, 2006). 
 
The role of emotional processing in the generation of paradigmatic cases of moral 
intuition also leads us to reject the common assimilation in the philosophical literature of 
moral intuition to visual perception or to insight into logical, mathematical or other sorts 
of a priori truths. If the visual perception idea was correct, one would expect subjects 
with intact visual processing but damage to areas involved in emotional processing to 
have the same intuitions as normal subjects–as we shall see, the empirical evidence tells 
strongly against this. Similarly, if moral intuition is a special case of insight into a priori 
truths like those found in logic and mathematics, one would expect subjects with damage 
to emotional processing areas but intact areas that are known to be involved in logical or 
mathematical reasoning to have unaffected intuitions—again, this is not what is found. 
Other considerations support a similar conclusion: even among normal subjects the 
deliverances/assessments of moral intuition are simply not as widely shared as the 
judgments that result from ordinary visual perception and are sensitive to the impact of 
culture and experience in ways that visual perception is not. Similarly for 
logical/mathematical insight–among those with the requisite training, the judgments 
resulting from such insight are far more universal than the deliverances of moral 
intuition, and the procedures for checking whether such insight is correct are very 
different from those involved in assessing the correctness of moral intuition, if indeed 
there are procedures of the latter sort at all. 
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Third, we reject the common view (shared, for example, by writers like Greene 
and Haidt, whose idea are discussed in more detail below) that the processes that underlie 
the generation of moral intuitions are typically or always relatively “primitive” (Greene, 
2004, p. 389), relatively hard-wired or innate, fixed by our evolutionary history and not 
subject to subsequent modification by experience, and that these structures function only 
as relatively coarse-grained “alarm signals” that do not do “sophisticated information 
processing”. (Greene, 2004; forthcoming) Our contrary view is that emotional processing 
and the structures that underlie moral intuition can be heavily influenced by learning and 
experience, although the learning in question is often implicit and subjects often have 
difficulty formulating what is learned in the form of explicit rules. This implicit learning 
can be quite flexible and context sensitive–intelligent rather than stupid. Indeed, there is 
evidence that under the right circumstances the structures underlying moral intuition and 
emotional processing associated with them are often better at integrating complex multi-
dimensional environmental clues that are relevant to good decision-making than our 
efforts at explicit conscious deliberation. 
 
Of course, as we have already noted, for moral philosophers, the central question 
about moral intuition is its significance, if any, for the assessment of various moral 
claims. Is the fact that we have strong intuitive reactions, either in favor or against some 
action, policy or proposed principle relevant to how we ought to morally assess these, and 
if so, why? Philosophers often respond to these questions by constructing blanket 
defenses of or condemnations of moral intuition. We will not follow either of these 
courses here. We think that better questions to ask are these: Do intuitive moral responses 
sometimes contain information that we can recognize as relevant to good moral decision-
making and if so, what is this information? Under what circumstances is such information 
likely to be present or absent? Does “intuition” sometimes play some functional role in 
moral decision-making that is not or could not be played by other sorts of psychological 
processes? What do we lose if ignore such responses or try to replace them entirely with 
some alternative? We will try to sketch answers to these questions below. 
 
Before turning to details, however, several additional remarks by way of 
orientation are in order. As the brief sketch of Stratton-Lake’s views above reminds us, 
philosophers often frame issues about the role of moral intuition in terms of categories 
like “truth”, “knowledge”, and “justification”. They ask questions like the following: Are 
most (or even some) of our moral intuitions or the judgments/beliefs associated with 
them “true”? Do intuitions yield moral “knowledge” or “justified” moral belief? If the 
moral beliefs associated with intuitions are sometimes “true”, then what are the “truth 
makers” for such beliefs–facts about non-natural properties, such as the “rightness” of 
various actions, as Stratton-Lake supposes? In what follows we will try as best we can to 
avoid such questions, for several reasons. First, they are highly controversial and it is 
unclear how to resolve them. Second, we don’t think that we need to take a stand on them 
for the purposes of this essay. In particular, we don’t think that the claims we make about 
the processes that underlie moral intuitions or even the claims that we make about its 
normative significance require that we answer such questions. We thus think, in 
opposition to Stratton-Lake, that discussion of the role of intuition in moral judgment 
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does not require commitment to any particular metaphysical doctrine–either cognitivism, 
realism, non-naturalism, or their denial.  
 
Consider an example that figures in our discussion in section 4. A fireman is in a 
building in which there is a fire and suddenly has the “intuition “ that the situation is 
highly dangerous and that he and his men should get out immediately. As it turns out, this 
intuition is “correct” (trustworthy, reliable, better than the contrary intuition that he 
should stay–choose your favorite approval word ) in a straightforward common sense 
way: The floor on which they were standing was about to collapse because there was a  
hidden fire on the floor beneath them, into which they would fall. The fireman’s intuition 
would have been “incorrect” or  “misguided” if, for example, there was no hidden fire 
below and he and his crew were in no danger. We hold that one can make such claims 
about correctness/ incorrectness and justify them without committing to any particular 
metaphysical/epistemological view about whether the fireman’s intuition amounts to 
knowledge, or about whether it has a non-natural truth-maker and so on. The 
facts/considerations to which we can appeal to assess the correctness of the fireman’s 
intuition are facts of a perfectly straightforward “natural” sort–the hidden fire, the effects 
on the firemen if the floor had collapsed, and so on. 
 
We think that a similar contention is true for moral intuition–while assessments of 
certain moral intuitions as more reliable than or normatively superior to others is a matter 
that is admittedly often far more controversial than our assessment of the fireman’s 
intuition, it does not help to resolve such controversies to become enmeshed in 
metaphysical arguments about whether moral beliefs can be true or false and so on. To 
the extent that there is some way of deciding or arguing about whether some moral 
intuitions about a proposed course of action are worth taking more seriously than others 
(see below), we can address such issues without taking a stand on the metaphysical issues 
described above. To the extent that there are no such procedures for assessing moral 
intuition, excursions into metaphysics will also be pointless. 
 
A second issue that deserves brief comment concerns the nature of our claims 
about the role of emotion in moral judgment. A great deal of recent philosophical 
discussion of this subject has focused on the semantics or pragmatics of moral 
language—when one makes a moral judgment, is the meaning or content of the moral 
judgment or its pragmatic function captured by construing it as having to do in some way 
with the expression or endorsement of certain emotions? Issues of this sort are explored 
in recent expressivist or sentimentalist accounts of moral judgment such as those due to 
Gibbard (1990) and Blackburn (1998). We take no stand about such philosophy of 
language projects, which we see as sharply distinct from our own. Our claims have to do 
with the causal role of emotional processing and associated neural structures in moral 
intuition, the effects on moral intuition when such processing is absent, and so on. We 
don’t think that anything in particular follows from these claims for contentions about the 
linguistic meaning, content, or function of moral judgments, including those associated 
with intuition. Specifically, we don’t think that our emphasis on the causal role of 
emotional processing in moral intuition commits us (at least in any straightforward and 
direct way) to an expressivist or emotivist account of the meaning of moral terms. 
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We conclude this section with some general remarks by way of orientation for the 
non-philosophical reader on the contrast between two different kinds of moral theories: 
consequentialist and deontological. The contrast itself is entirely orthodox and will figure 
figure importantly in our discussion below. However, the significance we assign to the 
contrast and in particular our distinction between that which we call parametric 
consequentialism and strategic consequentialism and our suggestion that the latter 
sometimes yields judgments that are closer to deontological theories than the former is 
much more controversial, although important to our overall argument. 
 
We may think of consequentialism as the doctrine that the rightness or 
wrongfulness of actions depends entirely on the goodness or badness of the consequences 
that the action produces. This characterization is of course highly non-specific since it 
leaves open both what counts as a consequence and how the goodness or badness of 
consequences should be assessed. (Classical utilitarianism of the sort represented by 
Bentham (1789) and among contemporary philosophers, Peter Singer, is a more specific 
version of consequentialism with the goodness of consequences being assessed in terms 
of their overall utility.) In practice, consequentialists have characterized their view in 
opposition to deontolgical approaches. These deontological approaches come in a variety 
of different versions but tend to share one or more of the following anti-consequentialist 
commitments: (a) the manner or way in which an action leads to an outcome or the 
structure of the intention with which the action is produced  has moral significance 
independently of the goodness or badness of the outcome itself1, (b) certain actions are 
morally prohibited, because, for example, they violate people’s rights, or are unjust or 
unfair even if they produce the best consequences overall, (c) actions can be wrong 
because they treat people as mere means to the production of good consequences or 
because they fail to treat people with appropriate respect or dignity. (Kant (1785) is the 
paradigmatic deontologist; contemporary deontologists include philosophers like Kamm 
(1993) and Thomas Nagel (1972).) As an illustration of (a), and perhaps (c), many 
deontologists will judge that there is a crucial moral difference between the two versions 
of the trolley problem above, despite the fact that in both versions the number of lives at 
stake under the available options is the same. Specifically, it may be claimed that pushing 
the fat man in front of the trolley involves using him as a mere means for saving the lives 
of the five and is morally wrong for this reason. By contrast, in the first version of the 
trolley problem, although diverting the trolley onto the siding results in the death of the 
one, it does not involve using him as a means (his death is a mere “side-effect”) and 
hence is morally permissible2. On the other hand, consequentialists (or at least parametric 
consequentialists--see below) tend to see no fundamental difference between the two 
                                                
1 More specifically, many deontologists claim that it matters morally whether an outcome 
results from an action or an omission and whether the outcome is an end at which the 
actor aims or a means to that end, or whether it is instead a mere side-effect of these. 
2 We use this merely to illustrate one characteristic deontological treatment of the trolley 
problem. It is well-known (cf. Thomson, 1976) that an account along these lines is not, 
even from a deontological perspective, normatively adequate to deal with all of various 
permutations of the problem imagined by philosophers. 
 11 
versions of the trolley problem and in both cases recommend the action that saves the 
greatest number of lives–that is flipping the switch in the first version and pushing the fat 
man in the second. Deontological theories thus yield judgments that are in agreement 
with most people’s intuitions about both versions of the problem while consequentialist 
theories yield judgments that are in agreement with intuition about the switching version 
but not with the fat man version. Consequentialists are thus inclined to dismiss our 
intuitions about the fat man version of the problem as simply mistaken. 
 
As an illustration of (b) and perhaps (a), many deontologists will think that it 
would be wrong to kill the one to prevent the murder of the ten in the Explorer example 
or at least that this example presents a very serious moral dilemma, in which it is far from 
obvious what to do. The reason why this action would be wrong is that it would violate 
the one’s right to life and even though it obviously would be desirable to save the ten (if 
there were some other way of accomplishing this) it matters morally how this good 
consequence is brought about—it is impermissible to bring it about by murdering the one. 
If the explorer refuses to kill the one, with the result that Pedro kills the ten, the explorer 
does not intend to kill the ten and hence is not responsible for the deaths. It is Pedro who 
kills them, not the explorer. By way of contrast, consequentialists have tended to suppose 
that if the facts are as stipulated in the example, it is obvious that the explorer should kill 
the one, since this will save the greatest number of lives. 
 
So far we have simply been describing how self-styled consequentialists and 
deontologists have tended to react to these examples. One might well wonder, however, 
whether consequentialism per se yields the judgments that are identified as 
“consequentialist” in the above examples, and relatedly, whether the opposition between 
consequentialist and deontological approaches is necessarily as stark as portrayed above. 
In fact, it seems clear that the judgments identified as consequentialist are reached by 
restricting the relevant consequences (in part by stipulating away other relevant 
considerations) just to a comparison of the number of lives saved (in the examples as 
described) under the various courses of action available to the decision maker. Thus in 
the Explorer case,  those consequentialists who think it obvious that you should shoot the 
one often simply assume or stipulate that the example has various other features that 
remove many other considerations that would be present in real life cases of this sort, and 
which would be relevant from both a consequentialist and a deontological perspective. 
For example, it is typically assumed that the explorer somehow knows for certain that 
Pedro will not renege on his end of the deal, killing the other nine after you kill the one, 
that killing the one will not create an incentive for Pedro and others like him to make 
similar threats in the future, and so on. Thus the consequentialist decision-maker does not 
have to take these possibilities into consideration, as he would need to in the real world. 
 
It is a natural thought that if one were to instead work with richer examples with 
the features that would be present in realistic, real-life cases (e.g. uncertainty about what 
Pedro  will do), it would be far less obvious that a sophisticated consequentialism (which 
is both sensitive to uncertainty and attempts to take into account both immediate and 
more indirect or long run consequences) would recommend cooperating with Pedro or 
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that it would necessarily yield judgments that are starkly different from more 
“deontological” theories in other cases. 
 
We will not try to seriously argue for this claim here (doing so would require 
another paper, if not a book) but we do wish to suggest the following distinction between 
two different forms of consequentialsm which will inform the remainder of our 
discussion. Strategic or sophisticated consequentialists are sensitive to the dynamic, 
interactive or strategic aspects of moral decision making and to the uncertainties that 
result from these.  Strategic consequentialists recognize that when they make moral 
decisions they are typically embedded in an ongoing interaction with other actors who 
will respond in complex ways that are not easy to predict, depending on the decision-
maker’s choices, and that these responses will in turn present the original decision-maker 
with additional decisions and so on–in other words, that they are involved in a complex 
repeated game of some kind. Strategic consequentialists thus tend to be sensitive to the 
incentives that their choices create, to the informational limitations and asymmetries they 
face, and to the opportunities for misrepresentation these create, and also to 
considerations having to do with motives and intentions, since these are highly relevant to 
predicting how others will behave. They also recognize that one’s present choices may 
affect one’s future behavior (by, for example, creating habits or tastes or by sensitizing or 
desensitizing one to various outcomes). In addition, they recognize that those with whom 
they are dealing may not be consequentialists, and may be heavily influenced by non-
consequentialst considerations in deciding how to respond the decision-maker’s original 
choices. John Stuart Mill’s moral and political thought (Mill, 1859) has many elements 
characteristic of strategic consequentialism, and the same holds for Peter Railton (2003) 
and Alan Gibbard (1990), among contemporary philosophers. 
 
By contrast, parametric consequentialists tend to think of the behavior of others as 
fixed or parametric, independently of their choices, so that they don’t need to worry about 
long run interaction effects, incentives, and so on. In part because of this, they think of 
the decision problems they face as having a relatively simple structure about which they 
are likely to have adequate information. While the methodology that naturally goes along 
with strategic consequentialism is some (empirically adequate) version of game theory, 
the methodology that guides the parametric consequentialist is closer to classical, one 
person decision theory in which the decision-maker maximizes value, assuming a fixed 
environment. Among contemporary moral philosophers, Peter Singer (1993) is one of the 
clearest exemplars of this sort of approach, as is Peter Unger (1996), to the extent that his 
views are consequentialist. 
 
The relevance of this distinction to moral philosophy is that many of the 
normative recommendations that are regarded as characteristically consequentialist in 
that literature seem to follow from parametric versions of consequentialism but do not 
obviously follow from more strategic versions, which at least in some circumstances 
arguably yield judgments that are closer to traditional deontological approaches. (One 
indication of this is that the normative recommendations advanced by strategic 
consequentialists like Mill, Gibbard and Railton often look closer to what deontologists 
recommend than do the recommendations of parametric utilitarians like Singer.) This in 
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turn has important consequences for the origins of moral intuitions and deontological 
intuitions in particular. As we have seen, many philosophers (including many if not most 
deontologists) have supposed that moral intuition delivers a priori truths like those of 
logic and mathematics, hence truths that are independent of and do not have their source 
in experience. This idea fits badly with many empirical observations, including 
observations about the role of brain areas involved in social/emotional processing in 
moral intuition and the fact that, as we shall see, these areas seem differentially involved 
in characteristically deontological intuitions. 
 
Our remarks about the relationship between strategic versions of 
consequentialism and traditional deontolgical theories suggests an alternative source for 
deontolgical intuitions, one that fits better with these empirical observations. On this 
alternative picture, moral intuitions in general, including deontological intuitions, do at 
least sometimes reflect the operation of experienced-based learning mechanisms, 
including those that rely on emotional processing, rather than insights into a priori truths. 
In particular we think that these intuitions sometimes incorporate information of the sort 
that is the distinctive focus of more strategic versions of consequentialism—that is, 
information about the mental states of others affected by our actions, how they are likely 
to respond to our choices, and so on. For reasons that will be explained below, it may be 
difficult to make all of this information fully explicit or to employ all of it in self-
conscious deliberation–hence decision making that is influenced by intuition, including 
deontological intuitions, may yield normatively superior outcomes to decision  
procedures that attempt to completely eschew reliance on intuition. 
 
The remainder of this essay is organized as follows. Section 3 advances some 
proposals about the role of the orbito-frontal, insular and anterior cingulate cortices in 
social and moral intuition. Sections 4 and 5 relate our views to other recent empirical 
work on moral intuition and social intuition and cognition. Sections 6 and 7 then explore 
some issues regarding the normative status of moral intuitions in the light of our 
discussion. 
 
3. 
 
In this section we develop a neurobiological theory of intuition. However, first we 
want to provide a definition of intuition and contrast this with deliberation. Intuition is a 
form of cognition in which many variables are rapidly evaluated in parallel and 
compressed into a single dimension. This compression facilitates fast decision-making. In 
contrast with deliberative cognition, we typically are not aware of the logical steps or 
assumptions underlying this process although intuition is based on experience-dependent 
probabilistic models. Instead we feel the intuitive process as visceral sensations (gut 
feelings). Intuition involves the rapid comparison of a current transaction with previously 
experienced similar events and a visceral assessment of the probability of a favorable or 
unfavorable outcome for the current transaction. Deliberation is much slower and 
typically involves the serial processes of inductive and/or deductive reasoning. Both 
intuition and deliberation are logic driven, but forms of logic differ, with intuition being 
based on probabilistic inference and deliberation on conscious, usually verbally mediated, 
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reasoning. Intuition is plastic; it is not instinct, although instinctive feelings may 
contribute to it. Emotional value judgments contribute to both intuition and deliberation. 
Focused attention and the exclusion of other information are required for deliberation, but 
not for intuition. We tend to rely on intuition in complex situations involving many 
variables and a high degree of uncertainty and which demand immediate decisions, which 
are characteristic features of many social interactions. We tend to rely on deliberation in 
situations which lend themselves to explicit step-by-step verbally mediated reasoning 
where a rapid response is not required. Many social interactions occur too rapidly, are too 
complex, and involve too much uncertainty to permit the exercise of deliberative thought. 
 
We propose that moral intuitions are part of the larger set of social intuitions that 
guide us through complex, highly uncertain and rapidly changing social interactions. Our 
moral intuitions, like social intuitions generally, tend to become more finely 
differentiated as we gain experience in life. The neurobiological substrate for these 
intuitions includes the insular, cingulate, and orbito-frontal cortices and associated 
subcortical structures such as basal ganglia and amygdala, all of which have been 
implicated by many functional imaging and brain lesion studies (Adolphs, 2006; Allman 
et al., 2005; Baron-Cohen et al., 1999; Berthoz et al., 2002; Damasio, 1994; de Quervain 
et al., 2004; Rilling et al., 2002; Sanfey et al., 2003; Shin et al., 2000; Singer et al., 
2004a,b; Zald and Kim, 2001).  Brain lesion studies have also revealed a very interesting 
feature of the neurobiological development of moral intuition. Damage to orbito-frontal 
cortex during the first few years of life has a profound impact on adult moral intuition 
and judgment (Anderson et al., 1999), which stands in contrast with early damage to 
speech and motor cortex, which is well compensated for during later development 
(Finger et al., 2000). This is not to imply that the system does not continue to 
differentiate through later stages of development, but that certain crucial circuits must be 
operative at early stages for the later stages to occur. We will return to the effects of early 
orbito-frontal lesions on moral intuitions in section 6. 
 
We propose that a prime input to the neural circuitry for moral intuition is insular 
cortex. In all mammals, the insular cortex contains a representation of the motor and 
sensory systems involved in the ingestion and digestion of food (Rolls, 2005; Small et al., 
1999). It is thus responsible for the regulation of food intake; the ingestion of nutritious 
food and the rejection of toxins. In primates, and especially in humans, there is an 
additional set of discrete inputs arising from the body that signal sharp pain, dull pain, 
coolness, warmth, itching and sensual touch (Craig, 2003) which endows primates with a 
much more highly differentiated cortical system for bodily awareness, with all the 
potential for neuronal plasticity and learning that are characteristic of cortical circuits. 
These highly differentiated inputs convey important elements of interpersonal contact and 
reflect the evolutionary development in primates, and especially in humans, of enhanced 
capacities for registering the awareness, individual identity, and memory of that social 
contact. 
 
The regulation of food intake is expressed in the primordial opposed emotions of 
lust and disgust, the consumption of the nutritious and the spitting out or vomiting of the 
toxic. Disgust means literally “bad taste,” and facial expressions of disgust powerfully 
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activate anterior insular cortex (Phillips et al., 1997), demonstrating the social component 
to this insular processing. We propose that the neural substrate for lust-disgust served as 
the evolutionary template for substrates for  the complex social emotions that tend to 
occur in polar opposites such as love-hate, gratitude-resentment, self-confidence-
embarrassment, trust-distrust, empathy-contempt, approval-disdain, pride-humiliation, 
truthfulness-deception, and atonement-guilt. The first of each of these pairs generally 
favors the formation of social bonds and the second tends to disrupt bonds. They thus 
range from the poles of prosocial to antisocial. Many of these complex social emotions 
are known to activate fronto-insular (FI) and anterior cingulate cortex (ACC). The social 
emotions  for which this  has been demonstrated thus far include lust (Karama et al., 
2002), love (Bartels and Zeki, 2000), resentment (Sanfey et al., 2003), embarrassment 
(Berthoz et al., 2002), trust (Singer et al., 2004a), empathy (Singer et al., 2004b), 
deception (Spence et al., 2001), and guilt (Shin et al., 2000), and it is likely that the others 
will be found to activate FI and ACC. We propose that the circuitry in insular cortex that 
originally processed lust-disgust served as a template for the evolution of the circuitry 
responsible for polar social emotions in FI and ACC. This is consistent with evidence that 
primitive mammals were solitary and that complex social behaviors are specializations 
within specific taxa of mammals, such as primates or cetaceans (Martin, 1990). Just as 
the insula has the capacity to integrate a large array of complex gustatory experience into 
visceral feelings leading to a decision to consume or regurgitate, so fronto-insular cortex 
integrates a vast array of implicit social experiences into social intuitions leading to the 
enhancement or withdrawal from social contact. By this theory, it is no accident that our 
language is full of visceral metaphors for social interactions, because they reflect the 
underlying neural processes. Interactions with specific individuals are “delicious” or 
“nauseating”, and these visceral feelings have powerful moral dimensions. 
 
Just as our capacity for the interpretation and appreciation of foods becomes more 
differentiated with experience and maturity, so does our capacity to differentiate more 
complex social emotions. Primary flavors such as sweetness and saltiness appeal strongly 
to children, whereas adults favor more complex flavors that involve the sour and the 
bitter, such as those imparted by the processes of fermentation and the slow aging of 
tannins in wine. Children tend to prefer tastes elicited by compounds with simple 
molecular structures (salt, sugar and fat) while adults often prefer tastes elicited by much 
more complex compounds. Indeed the characterization of these complex compounds 
challenges modern analytical chemistry. Similarly, children’s moral intuitions involve 
strong black and white “with me or against me” feelings, while mature adults will 
experience a far greater range and subtlety of moral intuitions that more closely match 
reality.  Adult subjects with lesions involving FI experience a narrower range of social 
emotions than do normal subjects (Zygourakis et al, 2006). 
 
FI and ACC are active when subjects make decisions under a high degree of 
uncertainty (Critchley et al., 2001). These areas are involved in the subjective experience 
of pain in oneself and empathy for the pain experienced by a loved one (Singer et al., 
2004b), which are powerfully magnified by uncertainty. They are also active in situations 
involving social uncertainty and pain such as the experience of guilt and embarrassment 
(Shin et al., 2000; Berthoz et al., 2002). Humor, which activates FI and ACC in 
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proportion to subjective ratings of funniness (Watson et al., 2006), may serve as a way to 
recalibrate intuitive judgments in changing social situations, thus resolving uncertainty, 
relieving tension, engendering trust, and promoting social bonding. The experience of 
humor has a similar ontogeny to the appreciation of complexity in flavors or moral 
ambiguity. Just as children love sweets, and possess simple black and white moral 
intuitions, so they tend to enjoy slap-stick cartoons, while mature adults have the capacity 
to enjoy more richly nuanced forms of humor that often involve the appreciation of irony. 
 
In this context it is interesting that FI and ACC contain a class of large bipolar 
cells, the von Economo neurons (VENs), that are found in humans and great apes but not 
in other primates (Allman et al., 2001; Allman et al., 2005). Thus the VENs are a recent 
evolutionary development that emerged since the divergence of hominoids from other 
primates. The VENs develop late in ontogeny as well as phylogeny. They first appear in 
small numbers in the 35th week of gestation and at birth only about 15% of the mature 
number are present. This postnatal increment in VEN population may arise by 
differentiation from some pre-existing cell type or by migration from a potentially 
proliferative zone in the ventricles. The VENs are more numerous in the right hemisphere 
than in the left, which is probably related to the right hemispheric specialization for the 
social emotions (Allman et al., 2005).   The VENs are selectively destroyed in fronto-
temporal dementia, which is characterized by difficulties is moral intuition, self-
awareness, appetite control, and bizarre humor (Seeley et al, 2006 and William Selley, 
personal communication).   The VENs are also greatly reduced in number in a genetic 
condition, agenesis of the corpus callosum, which is characterized by abnormalities in 
social cognition and humor (Kaufman et al., 2006).   
 
VEN functions are revealed by immuno-cytochemical staining with antibodies to 
neurotransmitter receptors. The VENs are strongly labeled with antibodies to the 
dopamine D3 receptor (Allman et al., 2005), which may signal the expectation of reward 
under uncertainty (Fiorillo et al., 2003). FI and ACC activity is coupled to situations in 
which the subject sustains a gambling loss (punishment) and then switches to a different 
behavioral strategy (O’Doherty et al., 2003), implying that in normal subjects these areas 
are involved in adaptive decision-making and cognitive flexibility. FI is also activated in 
gambling tasks when the subjects anticipate that their luck is about to change, which is a 
form of intuition (Elliott et al., 2000). 
 
The serotonin 2b receptor is also strongly expressed on the VENs (Allman et al., 
2005), and this receptor is rarely expressed elsewhere in the central nervous system 
(Baumgarten and Göthert, 1997). However, the serotonin 2b receptor is also strongly 
expressed in the human stomach and intestines where it promotes contractions of the 
smooth muscles responsible for peristalsis (Borman et al., 2002). Serotonin may serve as 
an antagonistic signal to dopamine, with serotonin signaling punishment and dopamine 
signaling reward. The activation of the serotonin 2b receptor on VENs might be related to 
the capacity of the activity in the stomach and intestines to signal impending danger or 
punishment (literally “gut feelings”) and thus might be an opponent to the dopamine D3 
signal of reward expectation. The outcome of these opponent processes could be an 
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evaluation by the VEN of the relative likelihood of punishment versus reward and could 
contribute to “gut level” or intuitive decision-making in a given behavioral context. 
 
ACC and FI are known to have an important role in interoception, or the 
conscious awareness of visceral activity (Craig, 2004; Critchley et al., 2004). In his 
theory of “somatic states”, Damasio (1994) proposed that this monitoring of sensations 
arising from the gut is crucial to adaptive decision-making. The presence of a serotonin 
receptor on the VENs that is otherwise rare in the brain, but common in the viscera, 
suggests an interesting extension of the concept that these areas are monitoring activity in 
the gut. Perhaps the expression of the serotonin 2b receptor on the VENs represents a 
transposition of this function from the gut into the brain, with these circuits emulating 
how the gut would respond but over a faster time course. This circuitry would enable the 
individual to react more quickly to threatening circumstances than if that individual 
depended solely on monitoring sensations arising from the gut. Also, the emulation of gut 
activity in the cortex would permit a greater degree of plasticity and learning to occur 
than would be the case in the mesenteric nervous system. 
 
Far from being evolutionarily primitive, the neurobiological system involved in 
moral intuition possesses at least three recently evolved components. First, there are the 
highly differentiated inputs to the insula in primates and especially in humans that 
subserve the sensations of pain, coolness, warmth and sensual touch which are important 
elements in differentiating individual identity in social contact and in self-awareness. 
Second, there is the emergence of a novel circuit component, the VENs in apes and their 
great elaboration in humans in FI and ACC, cortical areas which are strongly implicated 
in the social emotions and humor. Third, there is the expansion in apes and especially in 
humans of anterior orbito-frontal cortex, area 10, which has been specifically implicated 
in moral decision-making in emotionally charged situations (Greene et al., 2001). 
Damage to anterior orbito-frontal cortex in the first few years of life has a devastating 
impact on the capacity for moral intuition in adulthood.  We believe that these recently 
evolved systems are part of an adaptive complex supporting the increased complexity of 
hominoid and especially human social networks. We hypothesize that the VENs and 
associated circuitry enable us to reduce complex social and cultural dimensions of 
decision-making into intuition, thus facilitating the rapid execution of decisions. 
 
4. 
 
Within this framework of the distinction between intuition and deliberation, it is 
natural to contrast moral (and other forms of social) intuition with moral reasoning, 
understood as involving conscious inference, deliberation, or theorizing, associating the 
former with the operation of the automatic system, and the latter with the deliberative 
system. Jonathan Haidt adopts this view of matters in the characterization of intuition 
quoted in section 1. A very similar view of moral intuition is adopted by Joshua Greene, 
in remarks quoted below. 
 
We think that the general contrast between automatic and deliberative processing 
and the association of moral intuition with the former is very plausible. This association 
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is supported by, among other things, the work of Haidt and of Greene described below 
which emphasizes the quick, automatic character of much moral intuition and the 
difficulties that people have in providing reasoned explanations for these intuitions. 
However, in our view, some other very common claims in the literature about the 
characteristics of the two systems and their role in judgment and decision-making are far 
less defensible and have led to some misguided conclusions about moral intuition. 
Caricaturing only slightly, many researchers3 seem to adopt the following view: While 
conceding that the automatic system (and emotional processing in general) may involve 
“useful heuristics” that in the right circumstances produce results that are in conformity 
with generally accepted normative standards of rational, prudent or adaptive behavior, the 
literature tends to emphasize those circumstances in which the system produces results 
that are sub-optimal or contrary to such standards--that is, results that are biased or 
rationally indefensible. The automatic system is thus seen as employing “error prone” or 
“maladaptive” procedures. It is also commonly suggested that the reasoning system, 
when operative, tends to produce more satisfactory results or results more in keeping with 
normative standards of rational judgment. Thus susceptibility to various fallacies in 
probabilistic inference (e.g. assigning higher probability to a conjunction than to each of 
its conjuncts, as in the well-known Linda is a feminist bank teller example (Kahneman 
and Tversky, 1972)) is taken to be a consequence of the operation of the intuitive system, 
which may or may not be corrected by more rational processing. A similar picture is 
taken to apply to the moral realm: moral intuitions are produced by automatic processing 
that is error prone and hence in need of correction by rational deliberation. 
 
It is also commonly assumed not just that there is a distinction between the styles 
of processing employed by the two systems, but that the two systems are entirely non-
overlapping and temporally distinct in the their operations, and in particular that the 
operation of the automatic system usually temporally precedes any operation of the 
deliberative system and that once the latter becomes operative (if it does) , the automatic 
system is no longer operative and, moreover, no longer needs to be operative for 
normatively good outcomes. Instead, once the deliberative system becomes operative, it 
is able to intervene and correct whatever errors have been produced by the automatic 
system. Errors or unsatisfactory outcomes thus occur when the deliberative system fails 
to come into play or fails to adequately oversee the outputs of the automatic system, and 
the remedy for such errors is to encourage more active involvement by the reasoning 
system. Often this line of thought is accompanied by a sort of slide from the very 
plausible idea that the intuitive system sometimes makes mistakes that can be corrected 
by the deliberative system to the far less plausible idea that the deliberative system would 
make better decisions if had no or little input from intuitive system–a line of thought we 
find in several of the writers discussed below. 
 
Often this picture is accompanied by the further idea that the automatic system is 
more primitive, both phylogenetically and developmentally, than the deliberative system, 
                                                
3 In addition to Greene, non-philosophers who adopt something like this parametric view 
in connection with moral and political decision-making include Baron (1994) and 
Sunstein (2005). 
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more rigid (and modular) in its operation, and less modifiable by learning or experience. 
For example, in a recent paper, Greene, et al. (2004) contrast what they call “personal” 
moral judgments, which “are largely driven by social-emotional responses” with other 
sorts of judgments, which they call “impersonal” and which (they claim) are more driven 
by “cognitive” processes. Personal moral violations have a “ME HURT YOU” structure 
where the HURT component involves “primitive” kinds of violations–assault rather than 
insider trading (Greene et al., 2004, p. 389). The responses triggered by such personal 
violations are “pre-potent” and are heavily affect-laden–they have the characteristics 
associated with moral intuition in accounts like Haidt’s. The authors suggest that we 
share these responses with other primates and that they are thus relatively old in 
evolutionary terms. 
 
These authors also claim that often at least these “intuitive” responses issue in 
deontological or non-consequentialist/non-utilitarian intuitions or judgments–e.g., the 
judgment that it would be wrong to push the fat man in front of the trolley. By contrast, 
they claim that brain areas associated with “abstract reasoning and cognitive control” 
(dorso-lateral prefrontal cortex and parietal areas, according to the authors) are involved 
in more impersonal moral judgments and these “cognitive” processes have a preferred 
behavioral outcome, namely that of favoring utilitarian moral judgments. (We note for 
future reference that when the authors speak of utilitarian judgments, they often mean 
judgments that would be endorsed by parametric rather than strategic versions of that 
theory). According to the authors, these brain areas “house some of our species’ most 
recently evolved neural features and cognitive abilities.” When a subject judges that 
utilitarian/consequentialist considerations justify a personal moral violation that is 
contrary to intuition (pushing the fat man in front of the trolley) these more cognitive 
processes compete with and succeed in suppressing our more emotional (deontological) 
responses–this is reflected, for example, in the longer reaction times of subjects that make 
utilitarian judgments. Given this association of utilitarian/consequentialist judgment with 
structures that are seen as sophisticated and uniquely human, and deontological judgment 
with structures that are older and more primitive, it is not surprising that at least one of 
the authors (Greene) makes it clear elsewhere (Greene, in press) that he takes 
utilitarianism to be normatively superior to deontological moral theories. In this respect, 
Greene’s view is the analogue, within the moral realm, of a two systems view of non-
moral judgment and decision–making, in which the role of the more cognitive 
deliberative system is to suppress and correct the normatively inferior responses of the 
automatic system. 
 
In contrast to the views just described, our position is that good prudential and 
moral decision making requires the integrated deployment of both the automatic and 
deliberative systems (and cognition and emotion) working together and mutually 
supporting one another. There is considerable empirical evidence (e.g. Damasio, 1994) 
that subjects with damage to ventro-medial prefrontal areas (including the medial orbito-
frontal cortex) and/or insula, who are not able to make use of emotional processing and 
the signals or “intuition” this generates, often make decisions that are much “worse” by 
any reasonable standard, in terms of their impact on the subjects themselves and those 
around them, than those who do not have these deficits. This provides strong prima-facie 
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reason to think that such processes also play an important role in moral decision-making 
and to doubt that the normatively better decisions are always associated with greater 
involvement of the “deliberative” system and reduced reliance on intuition and emotional 
processing. There is also empirical evidence, described below, suggesting that normal 
subjects who attempt to rely entirely on conscious deliberation make normatively worse 
decisions on non-moral problems of high complexity than subjects who rely more on 
unconscious processing. 
 
We will return below (Section 6) to Greene’s association of deontological 
responses with emotional processing and the “intuitive system,” but to the extent that this 
association is accepted, it also seems to us to provide reason to think that 
characteristically deontological intuitions should not be automatically dismissed in 
making moral decisions–there may be information in these intuitions that is not readily 
accessible to more deliberative, self-consciously analytical forms of decision-making. We 
also emphasize that it is simply factually incorrect to think that the systems and neural 
structures involved in moral intuition and social emotional processing have been retained 
in unaltered form from other primates–instead, as remarked above, these systems have 
undergone very substantial changes in humans and support forms of social cognition and 
emotional processing in humans that are not present in other primates. 
 
 
 
5. 
 
So far we have been using words like “intuition” and “social intuition” without 
any very detailed discussion of what these notions involve or of how such intuitions are 
acquired. We think of intuition in general (including social and moral intuition) as the 
result of implicit learning involving various neural structures. It is characteristic of such 
learning that it is achieved on the basis of probabilistic cues that are present in a series of 
individual trials. Subjects produce a response of some sort (either judgment or behavior) 
and then receive feedback from the environment about the correctness or appropriateness 
of this response. “Correctness” here typically has to do at least in part with the subject’s 
desires and interests--the subject learns fruits of this color taste good, but fruits of that 
color do not, that others with this trait are friendly, those without it are hostile, etc. When 
learning is implicit, subjects who receive feedback may be able to achieve more correct 
responses over time but without being aware of which cues they are responding to in 
achieving improved responses, and without being conscious of any explicit rule which 
guides those responses. 
 
A well-known non-social illustration is provided by an experiment of Lewicki et 
al. (1987)4. The experimental task was to determine as quickly as possible in which 
                                                
4 This experiment as well as the experiment from Lewicki (1986) are discussed in 
Lieberman (2000) who also uses them to illustrate the connection between intuition and 
implicit learning. Lieberman also discusses a number of other experiments illustrating 
intuitive social cognition. 
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quadrant of a screen a target stimulus appeared. Trials were presented in blocks of seven–
in the first six the target was presented by itself; on the seventh the target was presented 
in the presence of distractors that made it difficult to identify. Unknown to the subjects, 
there was a subtle relationship between the locations of the target on the first six trials 
and the location on the seventh. Subjects received eleven hours of practice and over the 
course of this the speed with which they were able to identify the location of the target on 
the seventh trial improved. Lewicki et al. were able to show, on the basis of other 
experimental manipulations, that this improvement was due in part to subjects having 
learned the relationship between the first six and seventh trials, and was not just due to 
greater familiarity with the task. However, subjects were unaware of this relationship--it 
was learned only implicitly. 
 
A dramatic real-life example of implicit learning and reliance on intuition is 
described in Klein (1998). A lieutenant fireman with a great deal of experience and his 
crew are trying to put out what is apparently a small fire in a kitchen. They stand in the 
living room spraying water on the fire but this has less impact than expected. Then, in 
Klein’s words, 
The lieutenant starts to feel as though something is not right. He doesn’t 
have any clues; he just doesn’t feel right about being in the house, so he orders his 
men out of the building—a perfectly standard building with nothing out of the 
ordinary. 
As soon as they leave the building the floor on which they had been 
standing collapses [because of a much larger hidden fire in the basement below]. 
(Klein, p. 32) 
 
When questioned subsequently, the lieutenant had little insight into what 
prompted his decision, attributing it to a “sixth sense”. The lieutenant reported that at the 
time of the fire he did not consciously entertain the thought that the house had a basement 
and that the basement contained a much larger fire. However, under further questioning, 
it became apparent that there were specific cues to which he had responded—the fire did 
not react as expected to the water, the living room was much hotter than would be 
expected for a fire of that size, etc.—all of which prompted the reaction that he did not 
know what was going on but that “something was not right”, which in turn led to the 
decision to evacuate. Again, we see broadly the same pattern as in Lewicki’s 
experiment—implicit learning on the basis of past experience which leads to a 
normatively appropriate “intuition” but without extensive deliberative reasoning and 
indeed with little awareness of the processes that generate the intuition or the cues on 
which it is based. 
 
A well known example of compromised implicit learning and intuition is 
provided by the behavior of patients with orbitofrontal damage on the Iowa Gambling 
Task (cf. Bechara et al., 1994). In this task, subjects choose cards from one of several 
decks and win or lose money depending on the card drawn. Some of these are “bad” 
decks--they contain some cards with high rewards but the overall pay-off from these 
decks is negative. Other “good” decks have overall positive payoffs. Normal subjects 
learn to differentiate the good from bad decks and to draw from the former fairly quickly. 
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Moreover, they do so before they are able to provide an explicit rationale or justification 
for their selections. Measurement of their galvanic skin responses shows aversion to the 
bad decks well in advance of any conscious decision to avoid them. In some cases, 
subjects report having “gut feelings” that the bad decks are to be avoided. By contrast, 
OFC patients perseverate with the bad decks, in some cases even after they become 
consciously aware that they are losing money in drawing from them. They also fail to 
exhibit the galvanic skin responses of normal individuals. They thus appear not to show 
the implicit, intuition-based learning which is characteristic of normal subjects and as a 
consequence make sub-optimal decisions.   
 
Many experiments have demonstrated that implicit learning is important in the 
social domain–indeed, it is thought that an enormous amount of real life social learning is 
implicit. In another experiment, Lewicki (1986) presented information to subjects about 
personality traits of people portrayed in photographs. Unknown to subjects there was a 
correlation between these traits and hair length in the photographs. Subjects were then 
asked to guess about the personality traits of people represented in new photographs. 
They did so by extrapolating the hair length/trait correlation, even though they remained 
unaware of this correlation and when asked to justify their trait ascriptions, pointed to the 
eyes rather than the hair length of those portrayed in the photographs. 
 
Although this particular example may seem relatively trivial, there is a great deal 
of evidence for similar implicit learning in more complex social interactions. For 
example, in experimental studies of behavior in complex strategic environments 
(markets, auctions, bargaining games, etc.) with repeated interactions a generic result is 
this: subjects change their behavior over time in such a way that, according to some 
relevant criterion, their performance improves–for example, they make choices that result 
in their earning more money. In this sense, they learn (implicitly) more normatively 
correct or appropriate patterns of behavior. However, their verbal accounts of why their 
behavior is successful and even of the cues that they take to be guiding their behavior are 
often rather confused and bear little relation to the real reasons their behavior is 
successful. 
 
When philosophers talk about “moral intuition”, they typically have in mind 
responses that take the form of judgments (at least potentially verbalizable) about some 
example or episode which may be directly experienced, but more commonly is merely 
described in some verbal scenario. It is important to bear in mind however that social 
intuition generally and moral intuition in particular will often be linked not just to 
judgment but to non-verbal action or behavioral response in real life social interactions–
indeed much of the significance and value of moral and social intuition rests on  the 
contributions that it makes to such behavior. It is the capacities associated with social 
intuition that allow us to respond quickly and appropriately to the behavior of others, to 
correctly predict their behavior, to detect their intentions and other mental states and their 
reactions to our behavior and to adjust accordingly. In real life cases, it is typically 
intuitive social processing that allows us to detect from someone’s facial expression or 
“body language” that they are annoyed or afraid, that they are likely to co-operate or 
betray us, and to adjust our behavior accordingly. The standard view is that more 
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deliberate reasoning processes are too slow and perhaps too unconstrained in other ways 
(see below) to do this effectively in real time–thus (some) reliance on intuitive processing 
in the social domain is essential for successful social interaction. This is illustrated by 
those with autism spectrum disorders, who are severely deficient in social intuition and 
must rely entirely on more deliberative and calculative reasoning to guide their social 
behavior, with the result that this behavior is often defective and inappropriate (Allman et 
al, 2005). To think of social intuition in this way is to think of it as involving processing 
and acquiring information (learning) about the social world,  just as the fireman in 
Klein’s example acquires information relevant to the prediction of a hidden fire, but 
without the phenomenological features philosophers associate with learning, such as 
explicit formulation of alternative hypotheses or conscious systematic weighing of 
evidence.   If, as we have suggested, moral intuition is often best thought of as a form of 
such social intuition, it is far from obvious that we should try to entirely avoid reliance on 
it in moral judgment. 
 
6. 
 
We turn now to the very difficult question of what our discussion implies about 
the normative significance of intuitive moral responses. Is the fact that some action, 
policy, or principle   comports with or conflicts with “moral intuition” relevant to the 
moral assessment of that action, and if so, why? 
 
When posed in this very general way, we doubt that the question admits of any 
illuminating answer5. Reasons to discount the moral significance of at least some 
“intuitions” are easy to come by: there is considerable variation in people’s intuitive 
moral responses to similar actions both across cultures and within cultures, with different 
people having “inconsistent” intuitions. Even a single person’s intuitions may seem 
inconsistent and unstable over time. Many moral intuitions are based on mistaken 
empirical beliefs or have normatively unattractive sources–racial and gender biases and 
so on. Moreover, we have suggested that the most obvious routes to assimilating moral 
intuition to processes or experiences that are often veridical or truth-promoting (like 
visual perception or the experience of self evident steps in mathematical proof) rest on 
mistaken empirical assumptions about the processes that generate such intuitions.   There 
is also experimental evidence that intuition in some situations can be biased by recent 
experience in such as way as to result in poorly adaptive decision-making (Kovalchik and 
Allman, 2006).     
 
                                                
5 Commenting on the general issue of whether the quality of decision-making is improved 
by adopting more intuitive or more deliberative strategies, Lieberman (2000) writes, “the 
unexciting answer proposed here is, it depends” (p. 110). We agree. However, we also 
note that given the willingness of a number of writers to claim that more deliberative 
strategies will always or usually lead to normatively superior decisions, it is by no means 
trivial to claim that there are many circumstances in which reliance on intuition or 
deliberation and intuition together can enhance the quality of decision-making. 
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For all of these reasons, we are not inclined to try to construct a wholesale defense 
of appeals to moral intuition. Instead, we will confine ourselves to some suggestions 
about the kinds of information that may, under the right circumstances, be conveyed by 
moral intuition, and its relevance to moral decision-making. 
 
Our first observation in this connection is suggested by many of the examples of 
intuitive judgment described above. At least in the non-moral realm, it is entirely possible 
for an intuitive judgment to be normatively correct (reliable, trustworthy) even though the 
considerations that show the judgment to be correct are not fully known or recognized by 
or transparent to the subject at the time of the judgment. Thus, assuming that the 
normatively correct decision in the Iowa Gambling experiment is to maximize expected 
income, normal subjects begin to make normatively correct choices and to avoid the 
“bad” deck well before they can recognize or articulate in words what makes the choice 
of this deck inferior to the choice of the good deck, and while some subjects are able 
subsequently to recognize or explain why the choice of one deck is superior to the other, 
by no means all subjects who make normatively correct choices are able to do this. A 
similar pattern is present in Klein’s example of the fire-fighter who gives the order to 
evacuate–the intuition that immediate evacuation is appropriate comes first and the cues 
on which the intuition is based (and which rationalize it or show it to be reasonable) are 
not immediately accessible to the fire fighter–not part of the content of his intuition. It 
was only later, and then with the help of others, that it was possible to reconstruct the 
factors that led to this intuitive judgment. 
 
These observations have several immediate consequences that are relevant to 
philosophical debates about the role of moral intuition. First, it is a mistake to suppose, as 
many utilitarian critics of appeals to moral intuition do, that if subjects are unable to 
provide a systematic justification or “rational reconstruction” of the underlying basis for 
their intuitions, those intuitions must be unreliable, or not worth taking seriously. We 
should expect that in the typical case, both for moral and other kinds of intuitions, 
subjects will be unable to provide such reconstructions and have at best limited insight 
into the processes that produce their intuitions. This is consistent with those intuitions 
containing useful information and being normatively defensible. 
 
Second, there are good reasons to be skeptical of the common tendency among 
moral philosophers to make heavy use of supposed intuitions about highly unrealistic 
examples and/or examples with which people have little if any experience. We include in 
this category examples that are frankly science fiction-like, or physically or biologically 
impossible. (Judith Thomson’s (1971) case of spores that become attached to furniture 
and grow into people, Michael Tooley’s (1972) example of pills that turn kittens into 
human babies, and so on). We also include examples in which features that are usually or 
ordinarily present (because of facts about human psychology, human social and political 
behavior, and what people can reasonably know) are stipulated to be absent or very 
different from how they typically are. Cases in point include versions of the Explorer 
example in which, it is stipulated that you know for certain that Pedro will carry out his 
threat to the kill the ten if you do not kill the one, that he will not harm the ten (ever) if 
you do kill the one, that Pedro will never make such threats again, that no one will ever 
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find out if you do kill the one, that killing the one will have no additional ill effects on 
you and so on. Also in this category are standard ticking bomb examples involving 
torture: terrorists have put a bomb in place that will kill thousands soon unless disarmed; 
you have captured one of the terrorists who you know knows where the bomb is but he 
refuses to divulge this information; you know for certain that if you torture him he will 
reveal this information, and that if you do not torture him, he will not reveal the 
information; it is also certain that the torture being contemplated will only be used in 
cases of this very sort and never more widely. 
 
Philosophers appeal to such examples for a variety of reasons–because they are 
looking for cases that discriminate among competing moral theories and sometimes the 
only cases that will do this are unrealistic (a fact that is of itself of considerable interest) 
or because they hope to “isolate” which features of examples make a difference for our 
judgments by mentally removing other supposedly confounding features or by equalizing 
such features across pairs of examples. 
 
One reason for being skeptical of appeals to intuitions about such unrealistic 
examples is simply that, as we have suggested, the deliverances of moral intuition are 
most worth taking seriously when we have repeated experience with feedback that results 
in implicit learning. If we are presented instead with examples with which we have little 
or no such experience–either because they are impossible or highly unlikely or atypical -- 
then it is unclear why we should take our intuitive responses seriously or what they show. 
This is perhaps obvious enough in the science fiction examples but we think it holds as 
well for examples that make assumptions that we have good reason to believe are highly 
unrealistic. Thus, if, as we would claim, the historical record indicates that once the use 
of torture is legitimized in extreme situations, it is virtually always “abused” in the sense 
of being inflicted in situations that are not “extreme” and on people who do not have 
information of imminent momentous crimes that cannot be obtained in other ways, then it 
is highly problematic to think that anything of moral importance can be learned by 
considering our reactions to imaginary cases in which none of these features are present. 
To the extent that our intuitions about torture, or about whether you should succumb to 
the threats of people like Pedro have been shaped by any process of learning with 
feedback, what they have been shaped by (and are sensitive to) is actual, real life 
experiences in which the stipulated-away features have usually or always been present. 
Moreover, it is implausible that people have introspective access which allows them to 
identify isolatable features of situations to isolatable features to which their intuitions are 
responding. Instead, to the extent that a learning with feedback process is operative, it is 
likely that intuitions are often shaped in a very holistic way by experiences with real-life 
situations in all of their embedded complexity, with people often having very limited 
access to the specific factors which shape particular features of these overall reactions. 
 
In the non-moral cases described above, we have urged that there is a 
straightforward un-mysterious naturalistic explanation (involving repeated experience 
with feedback resulting in implicit learning) for how subjects come to make intuitive 
judgments that are normatively correct. There is no need to posit special faculties (over 
and above ordinary sense perception and emotional responses) that put us in touch with 
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non-natural properties, or that yield insights into a priori truths. The question we now 
want to explore is whether a similar story might be told about moral intuition, at least 
under the right conditions. Suppose that one is trying to decide whether it would be 
morally right to perform some possible course of action A. Suppose (we hope 
uncontroversially) that one is more likely to arrive at a morally defensible 
decision/assessment of A if this assessment reflects the operation of some process that 
exhibits the right sort of sensitivity and responsiveness to facts having to do with how 
oneself and others will be affected by A, how others are likely to respond to A, how this 
will affect all those concerned and so on -- call this the morally relevant information. (We 
make no restrictive assumptions about what this information may involve—it may 
include the kinds of information that both (parametric and strategic) utilitarians and 
deontologists think are relevant to moral decisions). Suppose one decides by consulting 
one’s intuitive reactions to A. One thing this might involve, for example, is imagining or 
simulating doing A and seeing what it feels like, what one’s emotional reaction to having 
performed this imagined action is or alternatively what it would feel like to be on the 
receiving end of A. If one’s intuitive reactions to A track the morally relevant 
information in the right way, then these reactions may provide us with morally good 
advice about what to do in much the same way as the intuitive responses of the normal 
subjects in Damasio’s card experiment help to guide them in making prudentially good 
decisions. In effect, one would be using oneself (and more specifically one’s intuitive 
moral reactions) as a sort of instrument (a “moral thermometer”) that yields 
recommendations about what to judge or do, just as the subjects in Damasio’s experiment 
use their visceral reactions to the two decks of cards to guide their choice6. Someone 
following this procedure might take the strong reaction of disgust and outrage he or she 
felt upon seeing the photographs of prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib as a prima-facie 
indication of (an emotional signal of) the wrongfulness of the treatment of prisoners that 
occurred there. 
 
This suggestion raises an obvious issue that needs to be addressed. In the non-
moral cases described above, it is relatively straightforward what the subjects’ intuitive 
reactions are tracking or responding to when they are correct or appropriate, and the 
normative standards involved in judgments of appropriateness are uncontroversial. The 
fire captain’s intuitions track the presence of an unusually dangerous fire, and the 
intuitions of the normal subjects in Damasio’s experiments track something like their 
expected monetary rewards from the two decks. We think that the intuitions in question 
are normatively appropriate because it is uncontroversial that these are the features that 
good judgment and decision-making should track in these cases. By contrast, whatever 
the features may be tracked by our intuitive reactions to, say, different versions of the 
trolley problem or the Explorer dilemma, it may seem inevitable that the moral 
                                                
6 To the extent that one relies in this way on one’s moral intuitions in guiding moral 
judgment, we might think of this as a kind of intuition-based moral reliablism, but 
without (in our formulation) carrying with it the realist commitments of standard versions 
of reliabalism. That is, the idea is that one’s reactions track considerations that are 
morally relevant, but we don’t necessarily have to cash out the notion of morally relevant 
considerations terms of the detection of moral facts (see below). 
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significance (if any) of these features is going to be highly controversial. Here, in other 
words, we apparently run up against the difficulty that while there is a widely shared 
consensus about what the fireman should be responding to, there is much less consensus 
in many cases involving moral intuition. 
 
One way of out this dilemma is to ask what would be left out if we were to 
eschew all appeals to (or reliance on) moral intuition in moral judgment and decision-
making. Suppose that considerations that virtually all moral theories agree are relevant to 
good moral decision-making are likely, as a matter of empirical fact, to be neglected if 
we follow such a decision procedure and that we have empirical evidence that those who 
are unable to make use of moral intuition tend to make decisions that virtually all widely 
accepted moral theories agree are morally defective. Then we would have, as it were, 
generic reasons to think that moral intuitions sometimes track considerations of moral 
importance and that we would be ill-advised to entirely neglect them, even though it 
would remain an open question (to be settled on some different, presumably case by case 
basis) what normative significance any particular moral intuition has. 
 
The general picture we advocate of the contribution of moral intuition to moral 
judgment and decision-making is the following: in many real life cases (and of course 
especially in those that have the feel of a moral dilemma in which conflicting 
considerations seem to be present), the consequences of our actions for all of those 
affected will be extremely difficult to evaluate analytically – that is, by undertaking to 
construct an explicit list of all of the various ways that ourselves and others will be 
affected and then deciding what to do by employing some explicit rule that tells us how 
to combine or synthesize this information into a single judgment. This is so for a variety 
of different reasons. As suggested in section 2, a very important aspect of good moral 
decision-making involves successfully anticipating how others will react or respond to 
our choices, how we in turn may be led to respond and so on. In other words, moral 
decision-making has a strategic or dynamic aspect; typically we must think of ourselves 
as choosing not in a parametric environment in which the behavior of others is fixed and 
independent of our choices but rather in an environment in which the behavior of others 
will be changed in various complex ways by our choices. Predicting via explicit analytic  
calculation what will happen in such environments if we were to make one choice rather  
than another is notoriously very difficult. Moreover, both the behavior of others and the 
moral significance of our choices for them will of course depend on their beliefs, 
preferences, emotions, and values, including the beliefs and emotions they come to hold 
as a consequence of our choices—a choice which seems otherwise justifiable to us may 
be seen as insulting or demeaning by some of those affected, and a good moral decision-
maker will need to recognize when this is the case, and take this consideration, along 
with many others, into account in deciding what to do. Thus many moral decisions are 
made in situations in which a large number of different considerations are relevant (they 
are high dimensional problems) and under conditions of very imperfect information in 
which there is a high level of uncertainty about the full impact and likely consequences of 
our actions. 
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One role of the social emotions and of moral intuition is to help overcome the 
limitations of purely analytical or rule-based decision-making procedures such as cost-
benefit analysis. The problem with trying to make moral decisions on such a purely 
analytical basis is that it is very likely we will leave out (or fail to pay sufficient attention 
to or to be motivated by) considerations that are important, even from a cost-benefit 
perspective. This is in part because it seems to be true, as an empirical fact about human 
beings, that the number of different dimensions or different kinds of considerations that 
we are able to fully take into account in explicit conscious rule guided decision-making is 
fairly small – as we note below, empirical studies show that when presented with high 
dimensional decision problems that require the integration of many different kinds of 
information, those who attempt to decide entirely by conscious rule based deliberation 
often ignore all but a few dimensions of the decision problem. For example, in the moral 
realm we may fail to fully anticipate how our actions will be perceived by others (e.g. 
that they will be perceived as insulting or humiliating), how others will respond to our 
actions, how we and others may be affected by these responses and so on. In addition, 
defects in empathetic identification or sympathy may have the consequence that we are 
insufficiently motivated to take into account the impact of our actions on others. 
 
As a concrete illustration, consider the apparent approval by high U.S. officials of 
interrogation procedures that involved parading male Muslim prisoners naked  and in 
sexually suggestive situations in public places and in the presence of women, the use of 
religious insults, and threats involving dogs—procedures that anyone with even a 
superficial knowledge of Arab culture would recognize as highly degrading, humiliating, 
and offensive. Consider also the contention by some American commentators that these 
procedures were tantamount to “fraternity pranks” and thus not morally objectionable. 
Assume for the sake of argument that these procedures were prompted at least in part by 
a desire to obtain militarily useful information from the prisoners. Whatever the value of 
this objective, it seems apparent that the decision-makers and commentators failed to 
appreciate the full impact or significance of these procedures as experienced by the 
prisoners or the response of the rest of the world when these activities became public, the 
damage from which to U. S. interests almost certainly outweighed whatever benefits were 
obtained from the interrogations. In other words, they omitted or failed to see the 
significance of considerations that were unquestionably both normatively and 
prudentially relevant to their decision–making. 
 
One thing that engagement of the social emotions and moral intuition (and the 
visceral processing that accompanies them) can contribute in cases like this is to enlarge 
the scope of the considerations that are taken into account in decision making so that  
relevant factors of the sort described above are included as well. One way this can be 
accomplished is through the role of such emotions in simulating the mental states of 
others. A large body of evidence suggests that we often detect and represent the mental 
states of others (including their beliefs, preferences, intentions, and emotions) by 
simulating these via our own emotional processing—that is, in representing the mental 
states of others, we activate the emotional areas and processing in ourselves that are 
 29 
involved in the those mental states when experienced by others7 (Damasio, 1994). By 
further simulating how we would behave in the presence of this mental state in ourselves, 
we may also be able to predict successfully how others will behave, given that they have 
this mental state. In turn, the use of this simulation process has the important additional 
consequence that it has at least some tendency to have motivational force in our own 
behavior, since the simulation works by our actually undergoing aspects of the processing 
underlying the mental state we are detecting. Thus when we recognize that, say, another 
person has been humiliated by some activity by simulating this emotion in ourselves, this 
both helps us to predict how that person is likely to behave in response to that activity but 
also alters our own motivational set—both by directing our attention to the fact of the 
humiliation and making it more salient than it otherwise would have been and perhaps 
also by encouraging us to react negatively to it (regarding it as hurtful and disgusting). 
The “moral intuitions” many of us had in response to the humiliating and degrading 
photographs of prisoners at Abu Ghraib involved, we suppose, something like this 
process. 
 
On the other hand, if someone does not employ this sort of simulation heuristic 
very readily—either because of damage to brain areas involved in such processing or 
because they have learned to disregard the intuitive emotional responses that normally 
result from (or are engaged in) such processing, then the considerations we have just 
described—the recognition of the humiliation (or at least its full depth), and appreciation 
of its likely effect on the behavior of others is more likely to be missed. Instead, attention 
may be focused almost exclusively on other aspects/dimensions of the decision problem, 
such as the desirability of obtaining information. Although we have no way of knowing 
for sure, we surmise that this is what happened when interrogation techniques like those 
employed at Abu Ghraib were approved. 
 
This argument depends on the assumption that attempting to engage in purely 
analytic modes of decision-making (fully explicit rule-based deliberation) and neglecting 
to engage more intuitive modes of processing can lead to the neglect of relevant 
considerations and hence to normatively inferior decisions. There are both theoretical and 
empirical considerations that support this claim. The theoretical considerations have to do 
with the fact that conscious deliberation is restricted in the number of dimensions or 
attributes of a problem to which it can pay attention or take into account. Those who 
attempt to rely exclusively on this mode of decision-making thus often neglect or fail to 
take into account important dimensions of the problem that they face. By contrast, there 
is evidence that more intuitive, unconscious modes of processing are better at integrating 
“large amounts of information…into an evaluative summary judgment” and can lead to 
superior judgments and decisions for this reason (Djiksterhuis et al., 2006). 
 
There is also empirical evidence that supports these contentions. In a recent 
experiment, Djiksterhuis et al. (2006) presented subjects with a choice among different 
models of automobile. In one condition (the simple condition) these were characterized 
                                                
7 The role of “mental simulation” in intuitive decision-making in both social and non-
social contexts is also emphasized by Klein. 
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by a small number of favorable or unfavorable attributes, in different combinations (e.g. 
one car would have 3 favorable and one unfavorable attribute, another the opposite 
profile). In another condition, the cars were characterized by a large number of such 
attributes. Subjects were then either (a) asked to think about the cars for four minutes 
before choosing a favorite car (conscious thought condition) or (b) were distracted for 
four minutes by another task that required their attention and then asked to choose. 
(unconscious thought condition). In this second condition (b), subjects made normatively 
good choices (as measured by the number of favorable attributes the chosen car had) for 
both cars with simple and complex attributes, with no difference between these two 
conditions. In the conscious condition, performance on the simple attribute task was 
about the same as performance in the unconscious thought task, but performance on the 
complex attribute task was markedly inferior. Similar results were found on other choice 
tasks. 
 
In another, more ecologically realistic, study shoppers who made complex choices 
(e.g. furniture) were compared with those who made simpler choices in real life settings 
like department stores. Immediately after making their purchases, shoppers were queried 
about whether they had engaged in extensive conscious thought about their purchases 
prior to making them and then three weeks later were asked how satisfied they were with 
their purchases. For complex choices, conscious thinkers reported less satisfaction than 
those who reported engaging in less conscious deliberation. 
 
Similar results have been reported in other experiments–for example, Wilson et 
al. (1993, see also Wilson, 2002) report that students offered their choice of posters for 
room decoration and who are encouraged to engage in prior deliberation report less 
satisfaction with their choices in comparison with those who chose without much 
deliberation, and that when subjects in romantic relationships are asked to provide 
analytical reasons concerning how their relationships are going, these predict the future 
of the relationship less well than those who are asked just to report feelings about the 
relationship. 
 
These results suggest that unconscious processing, and the intuition or emotions 
to which it leads, can sometimes lead to better decisions than conscious deliberation, at 
least when the decisions involved are “personal” or “prudential”. It is important to 
appreciate, however, as Wilson emphasizes, that this is not to say that having more 
information rather than less makes for worse decisions, or that it is better to be 
uninformed, inexperienced, or naïve about the subject matter of one’s decisions. Instead, 
in Wilson’s words, what the evidence seems to support is the conclusion that 
 
We should gather as much information as possible to allow our adaptive 
unconscious to make a stable, informed evaluation rather than an ill-informed 
one. Most of us would agree that it would not be wise to marry the first person we 
are attracted to. If we spend a lot of time with someone and get to know him or 
her very well, and still have a very positive gut feeling, that is a good sign. (2002, 
p. 171) 
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We suggest that a similar conclusion holds for moral decision making. When 
what we call moral intuition is functioning in a normatively appropriate way it will reflect 
the operation of what Wilson calls the adaptive unconscious on a range of relevant 
considerations and experiences, issuing in a similar sort of gut feeling about the 
appropriateness or inappropriateness of some course of action. At least sometimes such 
intuitions will lead to judgments/decisions that are superior to those arrived at on the 
basis of more deliberative and rule-based decision strategies. 
 
7. 
 
We noted above the evidence from Greene et al. (2004) that emotional areas are 
more active in at least some cases in which subjects make deontological as opposed to 
consequentialist (that is, parametric consequentialist) moral judgments in response to 
hypothetical scenarios. Partial support for this interpretation is also provided by a 
forthcoming study by Koenigs et al., that found that patients with damage to ventro-
medial prefrontal cortex (and hence impaired emotional processing) made more 
utilitiarian judgments than normals in response to the same scenarios, although only on 
so-called “hard” dilemmas which are not resolvable by appeal to some simple generally 
accepted rule and which are assumed to require considerable emotional processing. As 
remarked above, Greene et al. interpret their results as showing that deontological 
judgments reflect the presence of distorting emotional factors which bias or interfere with 
the normatively superior judgments that would be recommended by more purely 
consequentialist considerations. We think, however, the results from ventro-medial 
prefrontal cortex (VMPC) patients might reasonably lead one to wonder whether 
emotional processing and the deontological intuitions with which they are apparently 
associated always detract from the goodness of moral decision-making. 
 
We want to propose an alternative interpretation of this data in the light of the 
considerations described above. We begin by reminding the reader of two of the 
distinctive features of deontological moral theories and judgments as opposed to 
consequentialist theories (or at least parametric versions of those theories). First, 
deontological theories are generally understood to attach an independent weight to the 
structure of the intentions and motives with which agents act, in addition to the 
consequences those actions produce. Thus deontologists characteristically claim that it 
often matters morally whether an outcome results from an action or an omission, whether 
the outcome is intended as an end or means or instead occurs as a “side effect” of one’s 
action, whether the outcome occurs as a result of one’s own action or instead as a result 
of the actions of others, and so on. Second, deontologists (at least of the Kantian variety) 
seem (at least in their own view) to attach a greater or different weight to considerations 
having to do with dignity, respect, and not “using people as mere means” than many 
consequentialists. 
 
Our proposal is that one reason why we (sometimes) find greater involvement of 
emotional processing when subjects make “deontological” judgments is simply that (a) 
emotional processing is more likely to be involved when subjects attend to facts having to 
do with motives and intentions (because such attention requires simulation employing 
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emotional processing, at least when these are present in situations involving complex, 
high dimensional choices) and (b) sensitivity to considerations having to do with dignity 
and respect requires empathy, and this too requires extensive involvement of neural areas 
like frontal insular cortex that engage in emotional processing. By contrast merely 
counting up the number of deaths associated with each of two options and choosing the 
option that produces the fewer deaths will often be a more mechanical rule-based matter 
and may not require much emotional processing. The qualification concerning high 
dimensional choices is present under (a) because we want to explicitly allow for the 
possibility that in some simple cases the deontological option also may be chosen on the 
basis of some simple, consciously accessible rule. For example, perhaps some subjects 
may generate “deontological” responses by employing a rule that says e.g., “it is always 
worse to produce a result via an action rather than by allowing it to occur”. This may 
occur even in the absence of emotional processing. We would expect emotional 
processing to be particularly likely to be involved when the choice is complex and high 
dimensional, where there is no consciously accessible rule indicating what to do, and 
where emotional processing can play the integrating and synthesizing role described 
above. In other words, the involvement of social emotions in tracking intentions, motives, 
etc. seems to become crucial when the tasks the subject faces are complex, and there is no 
consciously accessible rule to guide the subject’s behavior. This would explain the 
Koenigs et al. result that VMPC patients with compromised emotional processing 
generate deontological judgments like those of normals on relatively simple cases 
involving action/omission choices but diverge from normals in producing more 
“utilitarian,” less “deontological” judgments in cases like the fat man version of the 
trolley problem in which there appears to be no rule that is consciously accessible to most 
subjects that generates the deontological response.   Hauser (2006) shows that normal 
subjects are able to articulate rules rationalizing deontological judgments in some simple 
cases, such as those involving the act/omission distinction but are unable to articulate 
such rules in more complex cases in which they make deontolgical judgments. 
 
Thus while it initially may seem puzzling and paradoxical that deontological 
intuitions involve extensive emotional processing, given that prominent deontologists like 
Kant have held that the source of such intuitions was to be found in “reason” rather than 
the emotions, when one considers what deontological judgments are sensitive to, at least 
in complex cases, the involvement of the emotions is just what one would expect. 
 
If this suggestion is correct, then the characteristic moral intuitions of 
deontologists about outcomes that are intended vs. those that are mere side-effects, about 
using people as mere means, about treating them with dignity and respect and so on are at 
least tracking something.  There is no reason to think of these intuitions as mere 
emotional noise, or as due entirely to outmoded religious dogma. But why suppose that  
what is tracked  is  morally significant or important. 
 
This is a very large question, but a sketch of a possible answer can be found in our 
remarks above. Sensitivity to facts about people’s intentions matters to good moral 
decision-making because these facts are relevant in all sorts of different ways to what will 
happen when we and others choose various courses of action, to how others are likely to 
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respond to our choices, and more generally because such information is highly relevant to 
an appreciation of the strategic structure of human interaction. Consequentialist decision 
makers who neglect such considerations (parametric consequentialists, as we called 
them) are likely to end up with results that even by their own lights are morally 
undesirable. A similar story can be told about decision makers who neglect 
considerations having to do with dignity and respect, as our brief treatment of Abu 
Ghraib illustrates. 
 
To provide a further illustration that puts some concrete detail on this abstract 
claim about the connection between deontological-looking intuitions and situations with a 
complex informational structure having to do with motives, intentions, and dynamic 
interactions among people, let us return to the Explorer example. Recall the abstract 
structure: A threatens to produce some morally very bad outcome (e.g. to kill ten people) 
unless B does something that also involves a bad outcome (e.g. killing one person, C) but 
an outcome that is judged to be less bad than the outcome that A is threatening. In such 
cases, many deontologists will have the strong moral intuition that B should not kill C, 
even if the result is that A kills ten. At least some consequentialists will instead judge that 
B should kill C and will dismiss the contrary deontological intuition as misguided 
(perhaps on the grounds that it is a naïve, emotionally mediated overgeneralization of a 
salutary reluctance to kill in most ordinary situations to a case in which such killing is 
morally indicated.)  
It seems to us, however, that there is a plausible case to be made that it is instead 
this consequentialist judgment that rests on a very naïve and incomplete analysis that 
neglects the relevance of the sorts of considerations having to do with intentions and 
strategic structure to which we have been drawing attention. To begin with, in most 
realistic circumstances (recall that we have argued that our intuitions insofar as they are 
worth taking seriously are shaped by these), the recommendation that B should (morally 
ought to) kill C, will amount to advocacy of a system of rules or practices and associated 
incentives8 that allow A and others of similar mind (the As) to put Bs under a moral 
obligation to do what such As wish them to do, even when this involves the Bs acting in 
ways that (in the absence of the threat) all would agree to be wrong. Incentives are thus 
created for As to attempt to achieve their purposes by threatening to perform morally 
                                                
8 We recognize that some consequentialists will contend that we are not entitled to invoke 
rules and practices here. They will argue that the correct consequentialist 
recommendation is that B should kill the one but that this recommendation should be 
one-off, applying to this case only and concealed from others so that (supposedly) there is 
no issue of advocacy or creation of a practice. What B should do is one thing; what 
consequentialists should publicly advocate another. While we lack the space for detailed 
discussion, we think this argument will not work if we confine ourselves to realistic 
circumstances: among other things, if B follows this advice, A and the nine who survive 
will certainly know of his behavior and it is unclear why they will refrain from making 
this information public. More generally, there are all of the problems attendant on the 
consequentialist decision-maker/advice giver making different recommendations to 
different people/groups, the likelihood of this being eventually discovered, the likely 
consequences of this discovery and so on. 
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objectionable actions and for Bs to succumb to such threats. Thus by imposing 
appropriate threats As can put Bs under obligations not just to kill but to rob banks and 
deliver the money to them, to release As’ confederates from prison and so on. By 
contrast, under a moral arrangement of the sort embodied in a more deontological set of 
rules, As will not be able to put Bs under obligations to do what would otherwise be 
morally objectionable by threatening something worse. 
 
It is true, of course, as parametric consequentialists will emphasize, that if we 
have a system of rules according to which B is under no obligation to kill C, and B 
consequently refuses to do so, A may follow through on his threat to kill the ten. Note, 
however, that (again in realistic circumstances) B has no strong grounds for predicting 
that A will follow through on his threat if and only if B does not kill C. This is so for 
several reasons. First, given A’s behavior, it is likely that his intentions and purposes, 
whatever they may be, give him reasons to want the involvement of B in the killing of C. 
(If not, why doesn’t A simply kill C himself?) Insisting that B must not kill C, regardless 
of A’s threat certainly blocks these intentions of A. Moreover, if these are A’s only 
murderous intentions, and B refuses to co-operate, A has no motive for carrying through 
on his threat to kill the ten9. If on the other hand, A has other murderous 
desires/intentions as well – he’s all too happy to kill the ten or various other victims 
himself, or has independent reasons for wanting them dead, then we have no particular 
grounds for accepting A’s representations that he will not kill the ten as long as long as B 
kills C. We also have good reason to worry that if B complies, A will impose similar or 
worse threats in the future – e. g. B kills C, thereby saving the ten for the moment, but A 
makes new threats involving the ten next week. We don’t claim, of course, that these 
considerations show for certain that B will not be successful in preserving the ten by 
complying with A’s wishes, but merely that A’s future behavior is highly uncertain and 
that B and others should take this fact into account in his calculations. 
 
These observations barely scratch the surface (we have ignored, for example, the 
likely reaction of C and his family and friends to B’s choices10), but they do perhaps 
begin to suggest the enormous complexity of the considerations to which an adequate 
                                                
9 Perhaps the situation is this: A wants C dead but is not in a position to kill him (C is 
well–guarded, etc.) B is in a position to kill C. Furthermore B is a parametric 
consequentialist and A recognizes that he can obligate B to kill C by threatening to kill 
the ten, thus achieving A’s desire that C dies. If, on the other hand, B is not a parametric 
consequentialist and refuses to kill C, then unless A has some independent reason for 
wanting the ten dead, he has no motive for carrying through on his threat toward them. 
10 If C and his friends and relatives are all thorough-going consequenitialsts, then insofar 
as B’s killing C is the optimal outcome from a consequentialist point of view, they all 
(including C) will enthusiastically welcome it. But in the real world, with more realistic 
assumptions about human motivation, C and his friends are unlikely to see things this 
way. If they have the opportunity, they will resist B, violently if necessary. If B succeeds 
in killing C, C’s friends are likely to seek vengeance or justice against B, being 
unimpressed by the argument that B did the optimal thing from a consequentialist 
perspective. All of this should figure in B’s calculations. 
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moral analysis of examples of this sort should be sensitive, and the extent to which they 
centrally have to do with understanding the intentions of the actors, the strategic structure 
of their interactions, how others are likely to respond to their choices, and so on. Again, 
we emphasize how consequentialist treatments of such examples that urge us to discount 
our “deontological” intuitions and instead recommend that B should kill C tend to ignore 
or downplay these considerations, focusing just on the ten who are threatened if B refuses 
vs. the one who will die if B acts. We suggest that this restriction in focus is not an 
accident—it is plausible that our deontological intuitions are tracking or responding to 
these additional considerations and that those who do not feel the pull of these intuitions 
will also be those who tend to neglect these factors in their moral assessment. Although 
we lack the space for discussion, we think that a parallel story might be told about many 
of the other examples involving competing deontological and consequentialist intuitions 
in the philosophical literature. 
 
We recognize that the response of many deontologists will be that this suggestion 
has too much of a consequentialist feel to it to capture the true source and character of 
their intuitions. It will be said, for example, that the deontological prohibitions on B’s 
killing C in the above scenario focus just on the intrinsic wrongness of B’s killing C and 
are experienced as absolutist or unconditional in character; hence they cannot have 
anything to do with contingent facts about how, e.g., A is likely to behave under a moral 
scheme that permits him to place B under an obligation to kill C, etc. Our response to this 
is to reemphasize the observation made above that in cases of non-moral intuition it 
seems to be true as an empirical matter that people have relatively limited insight into the 
source and character of their intuitions—their phenomenology often reveals little about 
their provenance, either about what causes them or about what if any deeper normative 
justification they may have. We suspect that a similar conclusion is true for many moral 
intuitions: people may be right to have the intuition that it is wrong for B to kill C, but 
this intuition by itself may disclose little about why it is held – either about the factors 
that cause it or why it is a good or justifiable intuition to have. 
 
 We conclude this section with a final example, which we also take to illustrate the 
general point that it is a realistic and not just abstract possibility that the ability to 
empathize and to experience complex social emotions may enlarge the range of 
considerations to which the decision maker is sensitive (rather than, as some would have 
it, merely “clouding” judgment) and that this in turn may lead to greater sensitivity to 
“deontological” intuitions. (Here the relevant considerations are not primarily others’ 
intentions, but rather have to do with factors like loyalty and friendship.) The example is 
an interview with a patient with developmental frontal damage – hence impaired 
emotional processing from an early age (from a study by Corinna Zygourakis, Ralph 
Adolphs and John Allman). The subject is asked to view a clip from a documentary film 
which describes the efforts of Hungarian Jews to survive during the last days of world 
war II when they are being rounded up by the Nazis and sent to concentration camps. In 
this particular clip, one of the survivors describes a long march to a concentration camp. 
He and two other boys promised to stick together, no matter what happened to them on 
this difficult march. One of the boys, however, was injured and began limping. A German 
soldier noticed the limping boy and shot him, while his friends were too scared to stand 
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up for him. 
 
The patient was asked to rank the top three emotions that the person in the film 
clip feels (with 1 being the strongest emotion, 2 being the second strongest emotion, and 
3 being the third strongest emotion). She could choose from a list of: anger, disgust, 
embarrassment, empathy, fear, guilt, happiness, pain, sadness, shame, surprise. The 
patient listed pain, anger, and sadness but not guilt or shame (which normal subjects rank 
very highly in their list of top three emotions). The patient clearly understood what was 
going on in the film since she correctly responded to all multiple-choice questions about 
objective aspects of the film. However, when asked how she relates to the characters, she 
responded that she "couldn't imagine being in that situation". 
 
The patient was also asked the following question: "Did the person (actor) do the 
right or wrong thing in the situation depicted in this film clip? Circle a number from -5 to 
5, where -5 is the most morally reprehensible/morally unacceptable thing the person 
could have done, and 5 is the most virtuous/morally acceptable thing the person could 
have done". The patient responded by circling a 2. When asked to explain why she 
answered this way, she said, "I would have done the same. Either three people would die, 
or just one." 
 
Whether or not one thinks that the boys made a morally correct (or at least 
morally defensible) choice in abandoning their friend, it seems uncontroversial that, 
unlike the early orbito-frontal-damaged patient, most people do not think the choice the 
boys face is a straightforward and uncomplicated one, with the only relevant 
consideration being the number of lives that will be saved under each possible course of 
action. Instead, for most normal people, considerations having to do with loyalty, 
solidarity, friendship, the promise to stick together and so on, will also be recognized as 
relevant which is why normal subjects rank “shame” and “guilt” as among the emotions 
that characters in the film are likely to feel. 
 
The patient is clearly sensitive to a narrower range of morally relevant 
considerations than normal subjects, and this is the result of deficiencies in her ability to 
empathize and to experience complex social emotions like guilt and shame. This in turn 
leads her to see the dilemma the boys face as one-dimensional with the only relevant 
consideration being number of lives saved, thus biasing her judgment in (what would 
usually be regarded as) a “utilitarian” direction. Even if, in the final analysis, we agree 
with the patient’s judgment about this particular case, it seems overwhelmingly likely 
that her judgment about other cases in which empathetic identification and appreciation 
of the emotions experienced by others is morally important is likely to be defective11. 
                                                
11 There is an important additional point to be made about the role of intuition and 
emotional processing in moral decision-making that has to do with the significance of 
genuine uncertainty in such decisions. Decision procedures like explicit cost benefit 
analysis require that we assign definite probabilities to the various possible outcomes of 
the options facing the decision-maker. That is, they provide no way to incorporate 
genuine uncertainty in the sense of absence of knowledge of these probabilities (or even 
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8. 
 
We have been arguing that there may be a prima-facie case for taking our intuitive 
responses seriously as moral guides when certain conditions are met. One of the most 
important of these is that the conditions for some form of learning with corrective 
feedback be present (or some other process that plays a similar role) with this learning 
tracking considerations that are agreed to be morally relevant. This may take a number of 
different forms. The most straightforward possibility is that the subject himself has 
previous direct personal experience of the action in question (or whatever is the object of 
moral assessment), either as a doer of the action, or as the person acted upon, or as 
someone who has direct  experience of what it is like for others who engage in the action 
or are on its receiving end. In the case of torture, this would include those who 
themselves have been tortured or have witnessed torture and its effects. It is on the basis 
of these considerations that we should take e.g. the reaction of John McCain or Jacobo 
Timerman to interrogation techniques that involve torture more seriously than the 
reaction of Dick Cheney or Rush Limbaugh. 
 
The idea of an intuition-forming process that provides for an opportunity of 
learning with feedback from experience can be broadened in at least two ways. First, 
even in the absence of direct personal experience with the situation we are assessing our 
intuitive reactions may be influenced in various ways by the experience of others in a 
way that provides prima-facie support for taking those reactions seriously. (This may be 
the result of deliberate and self-conscious adoption of those reactions or it may simply 
reflect the fact that those reactions have been assimilated into the general culture in such 
a way that others are encouraged to have them.) Thus even in the absence of direct 
experience with torture, we may acquire strong intuitive reactions from those who have 
had such experience – either our contemporaries or those with such experiences in the 
past. For example, the strong revulsion of many political thinkers and actors in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, including the U. S. founders, who lived in a time 
when various forms of torture and cruel and degrading treatment were common have 
become to varying degrees part of the political and moral culture of many liberal 
democracies and influence contemporary moral intuition. The reactions of these historical 
figures reflect their lived experience with practices involving torture, as they are actually 
                                                                                                                                            
absence of knowledge of the state space of possible outcomes) into our decision-making. 
However, as urged above, uncertainty in this sense is a pervasive feature of social and 
moral decision-making. Explicit cost benefit methodologies may thus encourage 
overconfidence about our ability to predict or calculate expectations about what will 
happen and may lead us to attach insignificant weight to the possibility that there are 
entirely unknown dangers associated with our action and to fail to take “worst case 
scenarios” sufficiently seriously, on the grounds that they are thought to be very unlikely. 
By contrast, several neural systems involved in emotional processing (FI and ACC) 
respond strongly to  uncertainty (Critchley et al, 2001). The involvement of such systems 
in decision-making can thus help correct for overconfidence and encourage cautious 
behavior in the face of genuine uncertainty. 
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employed in real life contexts, and deserve to be taken seriously for this reason. A similar 
point holds for those who have lived under or have serious knowledge of contemporary 
regimes that employ torture. 
 
A closely related point is that by gathering information about the behavior of 
others in morally charged situations, and what happens when they make various choices 
in real life situations, we may put ourselves in a situation in which our intuitive reactions 
are being shaped by a learning with feedback process with desirable characteristics. For 
example, one may learn about actual historical cases in which people faced choices about 
whether to co-operate with evildoers in the hope of preventing them from doing even 
worse things (or in the hope of at least ameliorating the bad consequences of their 
behavior).  Or one may learn about what happens when governments  either give in or, 
alternatively, refuse to do so  when terrorists take hostages and threaten  to kill them 
unless the governments do their bidding.   
 
Yet another way in which a learning with feedback story about the shaping of 
intuitions may apply even in the absence of direct personal experience is through 
analogizing of the situation we are assessing to one with which we do have experience. 
Few Americans have direct experience with torture, but virtually all of us have 
experience with the intentional infliction of pain and humiliation. People can (and 
presumably often do) use their experience with actions falling in these more general 
categories to influence their reactions to torture. (There is, however, the obvious danger 
that reactions generated in this way may miss much of what is most distinctive and 
important about the unfamiliar particular case before us – torture is in important respects 
very unlike other episodes involving the infliction of pain and humiliation.) Similarly, 
very few people have experience with scenarios in which someone threatens others with 
death in order to get a second party to commit murder. However, many of us have had 
experience with situations in which someone threatens to do something bad to others 
unless we do something we regard as wrong or ill-advised and have learned, through our 
own experience or from the experience of others, that it is disastrous to give in to such 
threats in these circumstances. 
 
9. 
 
We conclude with a summary of our main claims, with an emphasis on those that 
make distinctive empirical predictions. 
 
1) The neural structures and capacities that underlie many prototypical cases of 
moral intuition are also involved in the processing of social emotions and fast social 
cognition more generally. These are at least somewhat distinct from the structures that are 
activated in logical or mathematical reasoning and also from those activated in visual 
perception. To the extent this is so, the ideas that moral intuition is relevantly like insight 
into a priori logical or mathematical truths or like visual perception (either in terms of the 
mechanisms on which it relies or the conditions under which it is likely to be reliable) are 
misguided. 
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2) Because of 1), subjects with damage to brain areas known to be involved in the 
processing of social emotions will have different moral intuitions in some cases than 
normal subjects or will perhaps lack such intuitions. Thus, for example, the moral 
intuitions of prefrontal patients and autistics will be different from those without these 
deficits. Manipulation of emotional processing whether by behavioral or pharmacological 
means will also affect the intuitions of normal subjects. Subjects who fall within a range 
of normal functioning but exhibit more or less than average sensitivity or susceptibility to 
social emotions (e.g. those with mild Asperger’s syndrome) will also exhibit distinctive 
patterns of moral intuition. 
 
3) It is an empirical question whether human beings make better moral decisions 
by avoiding use of moral intuition and emotional processing and instead deciding entirely 
on the basis of deliberate, conscious reasoning strategies. The analogous question has 
already been investigated in cases involving prudential or personal decisions (e.g. 
consumer purchases) and there is evidence that the involvement of intuition and 
unconscious emotional processing produces better decisions. 
 
4) Moral decision makers who do not employ normal emotional processing in 
their decisions (either because they are unable to do so because of neurological 
abnormalities, or for other reasons) will tend to neglect certain relevant dimensions of 
moral decision making—especially those having to do with information about intentions, 
motives, and likely reactions on the part of those affected. Such subjects will think about 
moral decisions parametrically rather than being sensitive to their strategic structure, 
neglecting considerations having to do with how others will respond to initial choices, 
long run incentive effects that alter the behavior of others, and so on. In this respect their 
judgments and decisions will look more “utilitarian”, in the parametric sense of utilitarian 
described above. Thus we should expect more utilitarian judgments on the part of 
subjects with autism spectrum disorders,  fronto-temporal dementia, as well as patients 
with damage to ventro-medial prefrontal cortex. 
 
5) We would expect the following abilities/behavior to co-vary together: (a) Good 
skills at mind reading/social cognition, including the ability to accurately ascribe mental 
states to others and to predict their behavior, (b) susceptibility to social emotions like 
guilt, embarrassment, gratitude, trust, pride/pleasure in the achievement and good fortune 
of others and awareness of when one is experiencing such emotions, (c) tendency toward 
empathetic identification with others as indicated on standard empathy measures, (d) 
tendency to be sensitive in moral judgment to certain of the considerations (intentions, 
motives, respect) emphasized in deontological moral theories, (e) because of (d) superior 
moral decision making as judged by both deontological theories and sophisticated (non-
parametric) versions of consequentialism. 
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